Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual Property Policy by Ghosh, Shubha
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 56 Number 2 Article 3 
5-1-2008 
Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual 
Property Policy 
Shubha Ghosh 
University of Wisconsin Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shubha Ghosh, Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual Property Policy, 56 Buff. L. Rev. 
409 (2008). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol56/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual Property Policy 
Erratum 
Issue 2 
This article is available in Buffalo Law Review: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol56/iss2/
3 
Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization,
and Intellectual Property Policy
SHUBHA GHOSHt
INTRODUCTION: PATENT LAW AND RACIAL CATEGORIES AS
INSTRUMENTS
Patent reform is at the forefront of current academic
and policy debates.1 Bad press on the quality of issued
patents,2 litigation disruptive to competition and business, 3
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currently, Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of
Law. J.D., Stanford University; Ph.D., University of Michigan; B.A., Amherst
College. The author would like to thank the following for encouragement in the
writing of this Article: Keith Aoki, Al Brophy, Dan Burk, K. J. Greene, Timothy
Holbrook, Jonathan Kahn, Thomas Mitchell, Pilar Ossario, Joshua Sarnoff,
Elke Suber and participants at the faculty workshop series of the University of
Wisconsin Law School and of INSITE at the University of Wisconsin School of
Business, at the Seventh Annual Intellectual Property Scholars conference in
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Center, and at the Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice at
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1. For the most recent academic study critiquing the United States patent
system, see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 5 (2008)
("Overall, the performance of the patent system has rapidly deteriorated in
recent years. By the late 1990s, the costs that patents imposed on public firms
outweighed the benefits.").
2. See, e.g., Patent Problems, Bus. STANDARD (India), Jan. 9, 2008, at 11
("[Tihe scope for misleading the patent office to get frivolous patents or even
ever-greening patents through selective information disclosure cannot be ruled
out. It is, therefore, important for the patent office to provide electronic access
to the proceedings leading to the grant of patent, including examination reports,
so as to ensure transparency and fair play.").
3. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("An industry has developed in which firms use
patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for
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and the perceived impact of a seemingly broken system on
innovation 4 have each-and in combination-driven the
movement to fix the patent system. This Article addresses
the phenomenon of "race-specific patents," that is patents
that cover inventions tailored to certain racially or
ethnically defined groups. Race-specific patents provide a
penetrating, yet overlooked, example of the way companies
have used the current patent system to expand the scope of
commercial activity.
As a tool to commercialize racially and ethnically
defined markets, ranging from the products of personalized
medicine to more conventional commodities, such as toys
and cosmetics, race-specific patents raise questions about
the proper role of intellectual property law in defining
markets and in advancing commercial interests. This
Article documents the phenomenon of race-specific patents
and presents a normative framework within which to assess
them. This normative framework dovetails with many of
the recent debates in patent reform, particularly the
doctrinal issues of utility and nonobviousness and, more
broadly, the success of the patent system in "promoting
progress." The analysis of this Article supports three policy
recommendations that have not been previously addressed
in the current patent debate: (1) race-specific claims should
not be enforced, (2) race should not be a consideration in the
nonobviousness analysis, and (3) race can be a limited
factor in the beneficial utility analysis. These policy
prescriptions not only enrich the current debate over patent
reform, they also inform the debate over the proper scope of
commercialization through the patent system.
The media spotlighted one particular "race-specific
patent" in 2005 when the Food and Drug Administration for
the first time approved a pharmaceutical product for
efficacy and safety within a specific racially defined group. 5
obtaining licensing fees.").
4. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS,
AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 170 (2004) (stating that the pathologies of the patent
system "undermine the very incentives it is designed to create").
5. See, e.g., Amy Barrett, Color-Blind Drug Research is Myopic; More-Not
Less-Study Is Needed on the Ways Different Races Respond, Bus. WK., June 27,
2005, at 44; Stephanie Saul, F.D.A. Approves a Heart Drug for African-
Americans, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at C2; Christopher J. Gearon, The Heart
of the Matter, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 15, 2005,
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The approval of BiDil, medication for the treatment of
hypertension, solely for use in the African-American and
Hispanic populations by the FDA came quickly upon the
grant of a patent by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office in 2002 for the chemical composition for
use in treatment of "a black patient," as stated in the first
claim.6 The racial focus of the claim was the basis for a
lively discussion in the scholarly literature and in the press,
cited throughout this Article, about the development of
race-specific pharmaceuticals in the emerging age of
personalized medicine based on genetic identification of
disease risks and treatment.
While my focus in this Article is on the use of racial
categories in patents in the United States, my research
question has implications internationally. Also, in 2005,
almost at the same time as the FDA granted race-specific
approval for BiDil, the European Patent Office (EPO)
upheld an amendment to a patent covering a method of
identifying the presence of a genetic sequence associated
with breast cancer among Ashkenazi Jewish women.7 The
patent was granted to a group of medical researchers in the
United States and the United Kingdom and licensed to
Myriad, a biomedical company in Utah. Critics of the EPO's
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/050523/23eehospitals.htm.
6. U.S. Patent No. 6,465,463 (filed Sept. 8, 2000). The first claim reads as
follows:
A method of reducing mortality associated with heart failure, for
improving the oxygen consumption, for improving the quality of life or
for improving exercise tolerance in a black patient comprising
administering to the black patient a therapeutically effective amount of
at least one hydralazine compound of Formula (I) or a
pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and at least one of isosorbide
dinitrate and isosorbide mononitrate, wherein the hydralazine
compound of Formula (I) is wherein a, b and c are each independently a
single or a double bond; Ri and R2 are each independently a hydrogen,
an alkyl, an ester or a heterocyclic ring; R3 and R4 are each
independently a lone pair of electrons or a hydrogen, with the proviso
that at least one of Ri, R2, R3 and R4 is not a hydrogen.
Id. col.17 1.53-col.18 1.57 (emphasis added). Claim 2 is a dependent claim that
refers to Claim 1 but limits it to the case "wherein the black patient has a less
active renin-angiotensin system relative to a white patient." Id. col.18 11.58-60.
Finally, Claim 3 also depends on Claim 1 but limits it to the case "wherein the
black patient has hypertension." Id. col.18 11.61-62.
7. See Sabine Steimle, Critics Question BRCA2 Patent Decision in Europe,
97 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1326, 1326 (2005).
2008] 411
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decision raised many of the questions about infringement,
personalized pharmacogenetics, and the quandary of race-
specific invention addressed in this Article.8 Although the
history of European anti-Semitism is different from the
history of racial stigmatization in the United States,9 the
precatory arguments I make below, particularly in Part II,
about race and invention have application across cultures
and histories.
My exposition of racial categories in patent law requires
an understanding of the difference between patent claims
and patent specifications.10 Claims are the portion of the
patent document that provides a legal description of the
invention. This legal description provides the metes and
bounds of the patent and the scope of what can be enforced
in an infringement action. Specifications include the other
portions of a patent, such as the written description and the
abstract, which provide a description of the invention
intended for the non-legal audience to read and understand
the invention. The specifications must disclose the
invention in enough detail and clarity to permit a person
with ordinary skill in the field to practice what the patent
owner has invented. While the claims provide the metes
and bounds of the patent, the specifications serve as an
interpretative aid to understand the language of the claims.
For example, the claims for a patent on a method of dying
one's hair may describe in broad terms the specific method
that the inventor has uncovered. The specifications, by
contrast, may lay out the types of dyes that can be used, the
8. See Ronald M. Green & A. Mathew Thomas, DNA: Five Distinguishing
Features for Policy Analysis, 11 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 571, 586 (1998) (expressing
concern over discrimination that would be facilitated by genetic identification of
cancer risk).
9. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 11-53 (1958)
(paralleling the history of anti-Semitism with the development of the concept of
the nation state). For the relationship between anti-Semitism and racism more
broadly, see GEORGE FREDERICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 170 (2002).
10. "The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it .... The specification
shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2000). For an analytical discussion of the relationship between
claims and specifications, see Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim
Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. &




types of hair to which the method might apply, and the
previous inventions for dying hair on which the patent
builds. In an infringement action, a court will start with the
claims to determine whether the defendant has in fact used
the patented method. If there is any ambiguity as to the
language of the claims, the court will then turn to the
specifications to provide an interpretative context to resolve
the ambiguity. 1
As I demonstrate in Part I, examples of race-specific
patent claims are rare, and while the case of BiDil may be a
harbinger of patents to come, the use of racial categories in
patent claims is to this date unusual. But my research did
uncover extensive use of racial categories in patent
specifications for the development of products targeted to
racially or ethnically defined markets. In other words, while
racial categories have rarely been used to define the legal
metes and bounds of a patent, they have served as
background context to aid in interpreting the scope of a
patented invention.
To illustrate the implication of race in patent law, I
document in Part I patents issued after World War II that
cover products for straightening (or dekinking or conking)
one's hair, for skin depigmentation, and for games or toys
commemorating Civil Rights leaders, among others, that
explicitly or implicitly take race into consideration in the
written description. Part I also documents patents, which
date from the early nineteenth century through the Jim
Crow era, that make use of negative racial stereotypes as
part of the invention. The most memorable, in my mind, is a
patent for an arcade type game that included the caricature
of a "negro stealing a chicken" as a target. 12 Therefore, even
the technical, seemingly dry area of patent law has not been
immune from the use of racial categories as part of the
implementation of the legal regime promoting economic
incentives. These few examples support a broader point: to
focus solely on patents as an incentive to invent ignores the
broader social context in which invention occurs and
patents operate. To ignore this context is to ignore the ways
11. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-17 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(presenting a methodology for claim interpretation that mandates starting with
the language of the claims and relying on extrinsic evidence when there is
ambiguity in claim language).
12. U.S. Patent No. 2,188,292 (filed Aug. 25, 1939).
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in which the jurisprudence of race and that of intellectual
property connect. 13
While race certainly has not been absent from patent
law, the intriguing question is what to make of its presence. 14
At one level, the identification of racial categories in
patents arguably reflects deep social hierarchies. If one
accepts the proposition that invention is embedded in
society, that the types of novel products inventors pursue
reflect the social attitudes of the potentially buying public,
then it should not be surprising that we see "negroes
stealing chickens" in the patent archive from the nineteenth
century. Furthermore, if biomedical researchers and
pharmaceutical companies currently see certain racial or
ethnic groups as potential sources of economic rewards or-
perhaps more altruistically-as neglected by the medical
profession, then racialized patents, like that for BiDil,
reflect a more benign recognition of changes in attitudes
towards racial difference. But racial categories in patent
law are not simply mirrors of social realities. Arguably, the
use of racial categories in patent law may serve to create
differences. If patents do crudely incentivize inventive
activities or more subtly structure the market within which
inventive activity occurs, then the use of racial categories in
patent law arguably creates racialized boundaries, perhaps
not as invidious as "WHITES ONLY' signs on bathroom
doors or drinking fountains, but at least as problematic. As
I analyze in Parts II and III of this Article, racial categories
13. For a discussion of the social embeddedness of invention, see THOMAS P.
HUGHES, HUMAN-BUILT WORLD 27-31 (2004). See also Mark Granovetter,
Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J.
SOC. 481 (1985).
14. For an important prior attempt to connect patent law and race theory,
see Jonathan Kahn, Race-ing Patents/Patenting Race: An Emerging Political
Geography of Intellectual Property in Biotechnology, 92 IOWA L. REV. 353, 394-98
(2007) (discussing valorization of white genes). For a discussion of African-
American inventorship and exclusions based on race within the nineteenth
century United States patent system, see JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP
AND SELF-HELP AMONG AFRICAN-AMERICANS: A RECONSIDERATION OF RACE AND
ECONOMICS 54-57 (1991). See also PORTIA P. JAMES, THE REAL McCoY: AFRICAN-
AMERICAN INVENTION AND INNOVATION 1619-1930, at 85-99 (1989).
John Boyle, a patent attorney, noted an interesting exchange between the
USPTO and a slave owner in 1857 over the rights of the owner's slave to patent
an invention. The USPTO denied the slave the right to patent because he was
not a U.S. citizen under the Dred Scott decision. See John Boyle, Patents and
Civil Rights in 1857-8, 42 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 789, 791-94 (1960).
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in patent law force us to reexamine the color blind and
accommodationist theories of race in order to assess the
normative underpinnings of both patent law and the use of
racial categories.
The substance of my argument can be summarized as
follows. Intellectual property is often described as a system
of incentives to promote progress through innovation and
creativity. This basic proposition has been challenged and
extended in many ways. Some argue that intellectual
property is better understood as a means of distributing
and disseminating creative works rather than creating
them.15 Others argue that intellectual property serves a
cultural or semiotic function to affirm cultural and social
values in the marketplace. 16 Even others argue that
intellectual property serves to distribute resources and
share the surplus in markets among creators, users, and
intermediaries. 7 One element common to these normative
positions is the instrumental role of intellectual property.
Intellectual property law serves to meet certain social goals,
rather than affirm and validate natural rights. The
challenge to the intellectual property system is the
definition of those goals. Understanding intellectual
15. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex
Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 134-37
(2004) (comparing justifications for intellectual property based on incentives for
creation with justifications based on incentives for marketing).
16. See, e.g., YOcHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOcIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 91-92 (2006) (presenting the
contours of social production); see also Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic
Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion,
Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 720 (2007); Margaret
Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOzO L. REV.
2821, 2874 (2006) (endorsing a substantive equality norm for intellectual
property); Shubha Ghosh, Exclusivity-The Roadblock to Democracy?, 50 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 799 (2006).
Although not addressing intellectual property, Professor Edward Rubin has
inspired me to think critically about synthesizing economic theories of
intellectual property and outsider and critical race analyses of legal institutions
and connecting intellectual property theory to theories of culture. Edward L.
Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1402 (1996).
17. See, e.g., ERICH KAUFER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 19-22
(1989) (describing patents as a means to appropriate returns from investment
in research and development).
2008] 415
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property in instrumental terms helps in the analysis of the
use of racial categories. When racial categories appear in
patent documents, they are markers for the social context
that gives rise to inventions. Validating racial categories in
patents may validate racist or racialist social practices.
They may also represent the realities of a diverse,
culturally rich, and racially defined marketplace. The
challenge is to construct a theory of racial categories that
helps to justify the instrumental uses of intellectual
property. These issues have been explored in the areas of
trademark and copyright. The issue of racially insensitive
mascots and brands raises questions about the goals of
trademark law.18 The issue of derivative works based on
appropriation of preexisting cultural forms raises questions
about the goals of copyright law. 19 This Article explores
issues of culture and race in the field of patent law to add to
the rich literature on culture in the law of copyright and
trademark.
The organization of this Article is as follows. Part I
documents the use of racial categories in patent law. Parts
II and III present the normative heart of the article, by
juxtaposing the normative claims of patent law with the
normative justifications for using racial categories. Part II
begins with an analysis of the issues raised by race-specific
patents under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Building on this constitutional foundation, Part II explores
the tension between the normative claims of patent law and
race. Part III reconciles this tension by developing a critical
cultural theory of intellectual property to assess race-
specific patents and suggest three policy reforms to deal
with racial categories in patents: (1) disallowing racial
categories in patent claims, (2) disallowing racial tailoring
in the nonobviousness analysis, and (3) limiting the use of
racial categories in the utility analysis. The conclusion
18. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44, 48-50 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(reviewing the decision by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to cancel the
Redskins' trademark as an offensive mark).
19. See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 80 (2001); Aoki,
supra note 16, at 722; Kevin J. Greene, Copyright, Culture, and Black Music: A
Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 375-83
(1999) (documenting the appropriation of African-American musical culture
within the regime of copyright).
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explores the implication of this argument for the role of
intellectual property in shaping culture and values beyond
economic efficiency and growth.
I. NEGROES STEALING CHICKENS, CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS,
AND BLACK PATIENTS: A CATALOGUE OF RACIAL CATEGORIES
IN UNITED STATES PATENTS FROM 1842 TO 2006
This Article will focus on the racial categories of
African-American and Negro. I chose these two categories
because of the recognized and appreciated cultural
understanding associated with these two classifications. I
have done a cursory look at other categories such as Asian-
American, Asian, Oriental, Hispanic, and Hispanic-
American. The set of patents I uncovered utilizing the
categories African-American and Negro were quite a bit
richer for the purpose of my discussion here.20
I performed the searches in late November and early
December of 2006. The search of "African-American" in
20. Narrowing my analysis in this Article to the racial categories of African-
American and Negro was the most difficult research choice I had to make. This
decision was motivated in part by the BiDil patent's focus on "black patients," a
focus that influenced my desire to study this topic more deeply. The focus on
African-American and Negro as the relevant categories was also motivated by
the rich set of patents I uncovered in my research. I should point out that many
of the epidemiological patents I discuss also include Asian-American and
Hispanic-American as racial categories to stratify the sample. Asian-Americans
have been a target population for study in the bio-medical community,
particularly Asian-American women. See, e.g., Denise Grady, Researchers Find
Distinctive Patterns of Cancer in Five Groups of Asian-Americans, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 2007, at A12; Cynthia Ozawa et al., Culturally Sensitive Treatment of
Metabolic Syndrome in Asian Americans, 18 HOME HEALTH CARE MGMT. &
PRACTICE 394 (2006).
For an epidemiological analysis of health issues facing the Hispanic-
American population, see CAROLINA REYES ET AL., GENES, CULTURE, AND
MEDICINES: BRIDGING GAPS IN TREATMENT FOR HISPANIC AMERICANS 11-14
(2004) (a joint publication of the National Alliance for Hispanic Health and the
National Pharmaceutical Council that focuses on four diseases: asthma,
diabetes, heart disease, and Alzheimer's).
My focus on race should not be read as neglecting or minimizing the
category of gender. For preliminary studies on gender and patenting, see
ETHLIE ANN VARE & GREG PTACEK, PATENTLY FEMALE: FROM AZT TO Tv DINNERS,
STORIES OF WOMEN INVENTORS AND THEIR BREAKTHROUGH IDEAS 1-4 (2002)
(presenting a context of female inventorship); AUTUMN STANLEY, MOTHERS AND
DAUGHTERS OF INVENTION: NOTES FOR A REVISED HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 1-5
(1993) (documenting female inventorship throughout world history).
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either the specifications or the claims resulted in 489
patents with the most recent in November 2006 and dating
back to July 1989. The search term "Negro" in either the
specifications or claims resulted in over 700 patents with
the most recent in July 2006 and the earliest in April 1842.
I divided these patents into six categories: (1) patents
involving epidemiological data from the African-American
population; (2) patents involving hair, usually making
reference to "Negro hair"; (3) patents involving skin color;
(4) patents involving toys; (5) patents involving methods of
sorting identities and names; (6) miscellaneous. Here are
some general observations on each of these categories. A
complete set of tables organizing these patents has been
compiled and is available from the author upon request.
A. Epidemiological Studies
This category is the largest containing over 500 patents
from 1989 to 2006. These patents were in the biomedical or
pharmaceutical field, and the specifications were reporting
medical studies considering the efficacy of drugs or medical
therapies in various communities. Since there were so
many patents in this category, I do not present the details
of the individual patents in tabular form. Other authors
have discussed these patents in greater detail, and I refer
the interested reader to their work.21 I will, however,
discuss a few of these patents as illustration of how racial
categories arise in this context.
Two patents illustrate how racial categories are used
in the specifications of patents involving pharmaceuticals
or medical therapies. In the patent for "Mammalian
Selenoprotein Differentially Expressed in Tumor Cells," the
abstract describes the invention as for "a 15 kDA selenium-
containing protein. '22 The abstract continues to state that
"[t]here is a correlation between the presence of a
polymorphism at nucleotide positions 811 and 1125 of the
15 kDa selenoprotein gene, and the presence of cancer. This
polymorphism is more prevalent in the African-American
population. ' 23 The written description cites some of the
21. See Kahn, supra note 14 (citing epidemiological studies).
22. U.S. Patent No. 6,849,417 (filed Sept. 28, 2000).
23. Id. at [57].
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scientific literature and studies that document the prevalence
of this polymorphism.
The purpose of emphasizing the prevalence within the
African-American population is to demonstrate the
importance of this invention, a factor that could be relevant
to the patentability requirements of utility,24 novelty,25 and
nonobviousness. 26 To meet the utility requirement the
applicant must show that the invention has applications
and solves some practical problem. 27 The reference to the
prevalence of the polymorphism in the African-American
population aids in demonstrating the practical application
of the invention to aid in identifying the existence of a
protein associated with certain types of cancers in a
designated population. In addition, illustrating the application
of the method to the African-American population indicates
a problem that was identified in the scientific literature to
which this invention would apply. The use of this invention
to identify a prevalent polymorphism aids in distinguishing
this invention from other identified proteins. Finally, to the
extent that this invention is novel, the applicability to a
specific population would aid in the argument that the
invention is nonobvious based on resolving a previously
unmet need or segment of the population, under the
secondary considerations articulated by the Supreme Court
in Graham v. John Deere.28
The second example of a patent whose specification
includes a racial category is one for "Method of Diagnosing
and Monitoring Malignant Breast Carcinomas. ' 29 The
method entails identifying certain biomarkers for breast
cancer in the saliva of women. The written description
provides several examples of clinical trials using the
method to identify its efficacy in diagnosing breast cancer.
In one of the examples, the applicant discusses demographic
and supplemental data obtained from the patients who
were part of the clinical trials. As stated in the description,
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
25. See id. § 102.
26. See id. § 103.
27. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-36 (1966) (explicating the
utility requirement).
28. 383 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1966) (explicating the nonobviousness requirement).
29. U.S. Patent No. 6,972,180 (filed Mar. 1, 2000).
2008] 419
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"[t]here were significant differences in race, tobacco use,
and menopausal status among the [subjects of the trials].
More African-Americans experienced carcinoma of the
breast and benign tumor lesions than Caucasians."30 The
last sentence is the sole reference to a racial category in the
patent.
Racial categories serve different purposes in these two
patents. In the Selenoprotein patent, the racial category is
used to demonstrate relevance of the invention to the
particular group. The importance of the invention supports
the patentability of the invention in identifying the utility,
novelty, and nonobviousness of the identified compound.
The racial category serves a purely descriptive purpose in
the patent for the diagnosing breast cancer. The applicant
does not use the differential effects in the two populations
as a basis for establishing patentability. Instead, the category
is used to summarize one of the clinical trials and to
describe the demographic composition of the sample studied.
No argument is made to highlight special benefits that
might arise for previously underserved or understudied
groups. These two patents together illustrate two different
ways in which racial categories arise in patent law within
the specifications. Racial categories in patent specifications
for pharmaceutical or biomedical inventions serve either
to support arguments for patentability or to describe
background racial characteristics of members of clinical or
epidemiological studies.
A third patent is the one for BiDil, discussed in the
introduction. There are two patents on the chemical
composition for BiDil, one issued in 2002 with fifty-four
claims31 and one in 2004, from a continuation application,
with eighty-four claims.32 The race-specific claims are the
same for the two patents, and therefore by the rules against
double patenting, the claims in the patent issued in 2002
would be effective. 33 The abstracts for both patents use
30. Id. col.14 11.13-16.
31. See U.S. Patent No. 6,465,463, supra note 6.
32. U.S. Patent No. 6,784,177 (filed Aug. 2, 2002).
33. Double patenting is not allowed under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000), which
states that "a" patent shall issue to an inventor whose application meets the
requirements of patentability. See Miller v. Eagle Manufacturing Co., 151 U.S.
186, 197-98 (1894) (establishing the rule against double patenting).
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identical language in describing the composition:
The present invention provides methods or [sic] treating and
preventing mortality associated with heart failure in an African
American patient with hypertension and improving oxygen
consumption, quality of life and exercise tolerance by administering
a therapeutically effective amount of at least one hydralazine
compound and at least one of isosorbide dinitrate and isosorbide
mononitrate .... 3 4
The first several claims echo this race-specific aspect of the
invention through the following language: "A method of
reducing mortality associated with heart failure . . . in a
black patient comprising administering to the black
patient . . . hydralizine . . . in an amount of about 30
milligrams per day to about 300 milligrams per day .
[and] isosorbinate dinitrate . .. in an amount of about 20
milligrams per day to about 200 milligrams per day."35
A challenging question is why the claim is limited to a
"black patient. '36 The written description presents the
clinical trials administered to test the efficacy and the
safety of the chemical composition. According to the
description, "[t]he placebo group mortality.., did not differ
between white and black patients. . . . The inventors
unexpectedly discovered that black patients exhibited a
significant survival benefit . . . from treatment with the
combination of hydralazine and isosorbide dinitrate. '' 37 The
inventors speculate on why there is this observed difference
in response between black and white patients. They cite
literature showing that black patients are less responsive to
Angiotensin Converting Enzyme (ACE) inhibitors than
white patients and this difference in turn reflects a less
active renin-angiotensin system among black patients. 38
Although the inventors could not identify the source of the
difference, the statistical difference uncovered in the
clinical trials was the basis for the racially limited claim.
The racial limitations reflect another important
dimension to the development of the invention. Both the
34. U.S. Patent No. 6,465,463, at [57] (filed Sept. 8, 2000).
35. Id.
36. Id. col.17 1.56.
37. Id. col.11 11.13-19.
38. Id. col.1 11.48-56.
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2002 and the 2004 patents cite a 1989 patent issued to one
of the inventors for a "Method of Reducing Mortality
Associated with Congestive Heart Failure Using Hydralizine
and Isosorbide Dinitrate."3 9 The patent expired in 2006. 40 It
is instructive to read the first claim of the 1989 patent and
compare it with the more recent ones:
[A] method of reducing the mortality associated with chronic
congestive heart failure in a patient with impaired cardiac
function and concomitant reduced exercise tolerance, comprising
the oral administration to said patient in need of the same of a
combination of (a) between about 75 and about 300 milligrams of
hydralazine or a pharmaceutically acceptable acid addition salt
thereof, per day, and (b) between about 40 and about 160 milligrams
of isosorbide dinitrate, per day.4 1
The two obvious differences between the 1989 claim
and the 2002/2004 claim are the differences in dosages and
the absence of any racial limitations. A consideration of
these two differences illustrates three points about the role
of racial categories in patent law.
The first point is that the 1989 patent would allow the
patent owner to prevent uses of the chemical composition on
any patient, without regard to race or other characteristic.
Perhaps the broad applicability of the 1989 invention
reflects an assumption that a pharmaceutical invention-
or, more broadly, any invention-can be used by all
members of the population absent some evidence, such as
the clinical trials documents in the 2002/2004 written
descriptions, that the invention empirically is suitable for
only one group. 42 The use of race-specific language in the
2002/2004 patents suggest a baseline rule of race neutrality
in patent law with the inventor being permitted to draw
racial lines if there is some empirical basis to support the
limitation. Such race-specific language seems to be
39. U.S. Patent No. 4,868,179 (filed Apr. 22, 1987).
40. Id. The patent term at the time of the issuance of this patent was
seventeen years from the date of issuance. The current term is twenty years
from the date of application. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). The patent term
can also be extended under special circumstances, depending on the nature of
the invention and the existence of delays in prosecution. See id. §§ 155, 156.
41. '179 Patent, supra note 39.
42. See Jonathan Kahn, Patenting Race, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1349, 1350
(2006).
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permissible even if the inventor cannot explain the reason
for the racial disparity, but can support it through
statistical differences, as the inventor did in the 2002/2004
patents.
The second point is the role of race-specific studies in
support of the claimed invention. It is telling that the 1989
written description does not disclose any racial disparities
or racial differentiation in clinical trials while the 2002/
2004 trials do. This difference may reflect a heightened
sensitivity to racial differences in the incidence and
treatment of diseases that has arisen in the thirteen year
period. While the National Institute of Health did implement
guidelines for race-specific clinical trials and funding
incentives for research in previously underserved populations
and diseases in the nineties, 43 these incentives may have
been less important for private, commercial researchers
working for industry, such as the inventors of the chemical
composition in the BiDil patent. A more likely explanation
is that the inventors were seeking to find some additional
commercial exploitation of the invention and discovered the
strategy of targeting the invention to a racially defined
market.44 Hence, the clinical trials demonstrated how the
chemical composition could be tailored to a racial enclave of
the market based on differential efficacy.
Building on the ways in which race seemingly entered
into the experimentation on and marketing of a chemical
composition, I turn to the third, and most crucial, point that
follows from a comparison of the two patents. The second
invention builds on the first invention by identification of
different dosage levels and of different efficacy for a racially
43. In 1994, the National Institute of Health issued the National Institutes
of Health Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women and Minorities as Subjects in
Clinical Research, which outlined "a wide range of new responsibilities for
clinical researchers funded by the NIH and for institutional review boards
(IRBs)." Charles Weijer & Robert A. Crouch, Why Should We Include Women
and Minorities in Randomized Controlled Trials?, in ETHICAL AND REGULATORY
ASPECTS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 171, 171-72
(Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al. eds., 2003). Under these Guidelines, "[a]ll NIH-
funded clinical research must now include representative numbers of women
and members of racial or ethnic minority groups." Id. at 172.
44. See Kahn, supra note 42, at 1351; Michael D. Ruel, Using Race in
Clinical Research to Develop Tailored Medications: Is The FDA Encouraging
Discrimination or Eliminating Traditional Disparities in Health Care for
African Americans?, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 225, 227-29 (2006).
2008] 423
424 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
defined group. The question is why these two together, or
separately, would be sufficient to warrant a second patent
on the chemical composition. By itself, discovering a different
dosage level of a chemical compound would not be enough
to satisfy the nonobviousness requirements of patentability,
unless there was some "unexpected result" from what was
in the prior art.45 The racial limitation, however, is more
problematic. If the inventor in fact discovered a new or
different chemical composition that worked solely for a
discrete group, there may be an argument that she has
found something new and nonobvious in light of the prior
art.46 The problem is determining why this distinction
occurs as an empirical matter in a way that would warrant
generalization from a few clinical trials. Demonstrating
that the chemical composition was found not to work on
some groups in some cases does not warrant a claim, either
as a matter of logic or of patentability, for the use or the
exclusive use of the chemical composition in all cases. I
discuss the issue of nonobviousness of race specific patents
in greater detail in Part III.
Even if this logical gap could be resolved, there is still
the question of whether modifying an invention for a
specifically defined group meets the nonobviousness
requirement. The racial tailoring of the 1989 invention also
explains the nonobviousness of the 2002/2004 invention. On
December 5, 2001, the patent examiner rejected the race-
specific claims in the application supporting the 2002
patent for being obvious in light of the 1989 patent. 47 The
patent applicant responded on May 6, 2002, arguing that
there was nothing in the 1989 patent that would "disclose
45. See, e.g., Ortho-McNeil Pharm. v. Kali Labs., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 2d 478,
522-23 (D.N.J. 2007) (change in dosage level not sufficient for nonobviousness)
(citing Merck & Co. v. Bocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 805-06, 809 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (changes in conditions for using invention, such as temperature or
concentration, not enough to establish nonobviousness unless there is some
unexpected result)); Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1362-63, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (altering chemical formulation not enough to show
nonobviousness).
46. See, e.g., Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapham Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d
1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring) (discussing the issue of
patentability of species claims over genus claims in the prior art and proposing
to allow such claims if there is evidence of unexpected results).
47. Memorandum from Raymond Henley, Jr., Primary Examiner, to Edward
D. Grieff, Registration No. 38,898 (Dec. 5, 2001) (on file with author).
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or suggest" the race-specific claims. 48 In addition, the
applicant argued that the efficacy in the African-American
population was an "unexpected result" which supported a
conclusion of nonobviousness. 49 The patent examiner
accepted this argument and, in an office action on May 18,
2002, concluded that the claims were nonobvious in light of
the unexpected result.5 0 This exchange illustrates, in part,
the application of the "teach, suggest, motivate" test (TSM)
to the legal question of nonobviousness. Under TSM, an
invention is nonobvious if a disclosure in the prior art
taught, suggested, or motivated the elements that makes
the invention different from those disclosed in the prior art.
In other words, a party challenging the patentability of an
invention on nonobviousness grounds must show what in
the prior art taught, suggested, or motivated the invention.
If the party fails to produce such a teaching, suggestion, or
motivation, he has not met the burden to show obviousness.
In the case of the 2002 patent, the applicant asserted that
the patent examiner failed to meet the TSM test and
furthermore pointed to the unexpected result, a secondary
consideration to support the conclusion that the invention
was nonobvious.
There is a serious question as to whether the racially
tailored invention would be found nonobvious in light of the
United States Supreme Court's 2007 decision in KSR v.
Teleflex. In this decision, the Court cautioned against a
mechanical application of TSM and acknowledged that
common sense of the person having ordinary skill in the art
can serve to distinguish obvious from nonobvious inventions.5 1
Would racially tailoring an invention pass this new test?
Assume for the sake of argument that the sealed crustless
sandwich patent is a valid one.52 Assume next that an
inventor creates a sealed crustless sandwich that includes a
48. Memorandum from Edward D. Grieff to Raymond Henley, Jr., Primary
Examiner, Registration No. 38,898 (May 6, 2002) (on file with author).
49. See id.
50. Memorandum from Raymond Henley, Jr., Primary Examiner, to Edward
D. Grieff, Registration No. 38,898 (May 18, 2002) (on file with author).
51. KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741-43 (2007).
52. See U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (filed Dec. 8, 1997). The claims of this
controversial patent were cancelled by the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences in September 2006, as Appeal No. 2006-1664 as part of Re-
examination Control No. 90/005949.
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spicy mix of peas and potatoes that in some parts of India is
called a kachori. Does this modification of the general
invention to the specific, ethnically tailored product meet
the nonobviousness inquiry? The answer may rest on the
ethnic identity, background, and experience of the person
having ordinary skill in the art. Whether such elements of
identity are relevant to the patentability inquiry rests on
how we understand the normative foundations of patent
law and the use of racial categories-the focus of Part III,
where I argue that "racially tailored" should not be a
consideration in the nonobviousness analysis.
In summary, this section has documented the patents
in the pharmaceutical and epidemiological areas that make
use of racial categories. This set of patents has been the
subject of extensive commentary. Here I present some
commentary on the underlying normative questions raised
by the use of racial categories in these patents. While I
agree with much of the existing literature on racial
categories in patents from the biosciences, my goal in this
Article is to address the use of racial categories in patent
law more broadly. With that goal in mind, I turn next to a
discussion of racial categories in five other areas of
invention.
B. Patents Involving Hair
There were seventy patents in this category, ranging
from 1904 to 2006. The inventions covered by these patents
included combs, pins, methods for straightening hair,
treatments for dermatitis and pseudofolliculitis barbae, and
methods for hair styling and coloring. The most recent
patent, in July 2006, was for a "Braid Removal Device. ' 53 It
is interesting to trace the dates of these patents. The first
was in 1904. The next was in 1922. A breakdown by decades
is as follows: 1920s: three; 1930s: zero; 1940s: two; 1950s:
three; 1960s: three; 1970s: five; 1980s: seven; 1990s:
eighteen; after 2000: twenty-eight. As is well documented,
there has been an active market for products designed to
limit traditional African-American features, and these
products were directed to facilitating passing. The patents
from the 1950s to the 1970s are consistent with that
market. The patents after the 1970s cover a range of
53. U.S. Patent No. 7,073,516 (filed Aug. 1, 2003).
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medical and cosmetic issues involving hair.
The first hair straightening patent that makes reference
to a racial category is the 1904 patent issued to Carl
Miller.54 The patent claimed a combination of a comb and a
heating device, which allowed the comb to be heated and
remove waves from hair. The claims were for the resulting
product and did not cover a method for straightening hair
that would be limited to a particular racial or ethnic group.
However, the specifications did make use of racial categories:
It is a well-known fact that persons of the black or negro race
generally and quite a number of persons outside of this race, some
even of the white race, have hair which curls so tightly or closely
that it cannot be combed into the desired form or parted by any
ordinary means or treatment.
By my invention I provide a simple device by the use of which
this intensely curly hair may be quickly and easily straightened
more or less, and thereby put into condition so that it may be
combed and parted. By the use of the said device the hair will not
usually be entirely straightened, nor is such a result desired, it
being preferred rather simply to remove the intense curl from the
hair, so that it may be easily controlled, but leaving the same with
a wavy appearance. 55
The description recognizes that the patented product
could be useful for members of the white race as well as
those of the "black or negro race." Despite this emphasis on
broad applicability, the language of the written description
suggests that the product was targeted towards the African-
American community. The 1922 patent for a specially
designed comb for the purpose of straightening hair was
more obvious of the targeted group. 56 The specifications for
this comb patent stated: "My invention has for its object to
provide a simple and efficient device for combing and
straightening the hair of persons of the Negro race and
especially designed for women's hair. '' 57 The two 1926
patents also specifically state that the inventions were
designed for use by members of the Negro race, without
54. U.S. Patent No. 763,012 (filed Aug. 25, 1903).
55. Id.
56. See U.S. Patent No. 1,425,757 (filed Dec. 30, 1920).
57. Id. col.1 11.11-15.
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placing any specific racial limitations in the claims.58
To the extent that the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 marks a watershed in consciousness of the stigmatizing
and offensive use of racial categories, 59 the uses of racial
categories in the hair straightening patents reflect these
changing attitudes only gradually. The ten patents on hair
related inventions issued on or before 1964 consistently
make reference to the Negro race as having particularly
kinky or curly hair, creating a close association between the
attributes of hair and membership of the group. The
written description of one of these ten patents in fact makes
reference to the hair of the Negro and Semitic people.60 The
association between hair and race continues to be
emphasized in the 1968 patent for a method of dyeing
human hair which allowed the chemical composition of the
dye to be stored more effectively as well as applied for a
longer duration. 61 The written description singles out an
experiment on the hair of an elderly Negro on whom the dye
worked as intended. 62 Two points are striking about the
1968 patent. The first is the general applicability of the
invention beyond the needs of any one particular racial
group. The second is the use of the racial category as a
specific example of the efficacy of the invention. Whether
the choice of Negro hair was conscious or accidental, the use
of racial category serves to support the universal applicability
of the invention. The inventor through the written
description, by pointing out the example of the Negro hair,
is emphasizing that the invention works on all types of hair,
not just the straight hair that may be the default assumption
of someone evaluating the invention for patentability.
The universality of the patented invention becomes an
important feature of many of the hair related inventions
following the passage of the Civil Right Act. But examples
of targeting inventions towards a particular group also
58. U.S. Patent No. 1,593,055 (filed Nov. 9, 1925); U.S. Patent No. 1,607,674
(filed July 17, 1925).
59. See Note, Recent Statute: Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 HARv. L. REV. 684
(1965).
60. U.S. Patent No. 2,238,544 (filed July 4, 1939) (referring to Negroid and
Semitic strains of kinky hair).
61. See U.S. Patent No. 3,369,970 (filed Nov. 10, 1966).
62. Id.
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continued to arise. For example, the 1975 patent for a
"Method and Apparatus for Doing Afro Hairdos" makes
specific references to particular type of hairstyle, "most
often worn by persons who are of the Black or Negro races,
or their descendants, and whose hair naturally has a high
degree of curl in it."63 But the written description also
emphasizes that "this invention is not limited to use by
Black persons as it has equal applicability to any other
person who may wish to wear their hair in the so-called
Afro style. '64 By contrast, the 1982 and 1983 patents for
"Hair Straightening Process and Hair Curling Process and
Compositions Therefor" specifically mentions the problems
of previous hair straightening processes to straighten the
"unstraight hair" of the Negro race and proposes a solution
that is less abrasive and harmful to the scalps.6 5 The
examples discussed in the written descriptions emphasize
experiments of the new process on the hair of Negro
subjects. 66 In this case, the inventor recognizes that the
hair straightening process is most likely to be used by a
person who is African-American and therefore attempts to
establish its efficacy with respect to that group.
Racial categories mediate between the universal and
the particular in patent law. No inventor limited the claims
for hair-related invention to a specific race showing that
inventors, or their attorneys drafting the claims, recognized
the applicability of the invention across individual consumers,
despite their individual racial or ethnic affinity. At the
same time, racial categories did play a role in the
specifications for two distinct reasons. In some cases, the
racial category indicated that the invention was targeted
towards a particular sub-class of consumers as the likely
beneficiary of the inventions. In other cases, the racial
category serves as evidence that the invention works across
groups and that the inventor had tested the product or
process beyond a narrow group. Racial categories seem to
provide context for the invention, demonstrating that the
new product or process would have a demand in the
63. U.S. Patent No. 3,892,246 (filed Apr. 4, 1974).
64. Id. col.1 11.16-20.
65. U.S. Patent No. 4,324,263 (filed Feb. 8, 1980); U.S. Patent No. 4,373,540
(filed Dec. 8, 1980).
66. '263 Patent, supra note 65; '540 Patent, supra note 65.
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marketplace and that this demand would exist beyond
certain enclaves of the population.
What is striking is that racial categories seem to
continue in this mediating function after the 1980s and in
many ways racial categories became even more salient for
patenting since 1990. Of course, dividing patents by
decades is artificial and may not be the best way to reflect
changing social attitudes and historical changes. But the
decade breakdown is quite striking in showing the continuing
viability of racial categories. Patenting for hair related
inventions increased sharply from 1990 to 2006 as
compared to the period from 1900 to 1989. I counted forty-
six hair related patents from 1990 to 2006 in which the
racial category of African-American, Negro, or black was
used. This is nearly double the twenty-seven hair related
patents utilizing one of these three racial categories from
1900 to 1989. This increase reflects the general increase in
patenting that has occurred over the past two decades. The
increase may also reflect the lowering of patentability
standards that some scholars have argued occurred with
the lowering of the standard for nonobviousness by the
Federal Circuit.6 7 To the extent that patentability also
stimulates or reflects increased innovative activity, the
increase in patents may reflect an expansion of inventions
stemming from a more prosperous legal and economic
environment. 68 Whatever the explanation for the increase
in patenting, one clear trend is that the use of racial
categories did not abate.
The function served by racial categories, however, does
seem to change even though as a general matter racial
categories continued to serve their mediating function. For
example, many patents for hair relaxers, hair straighteners,
hair loss treatment, and hair maintenance are intended for
the wide market with the racial categories mentioned as
specific examples of the universality of the product. A
striking example of this use of racial categories is provided
by a patent for an "Adjustable Hand-Held Shower Apparatus,"
67. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit:
An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 928-33
(2007) (assessing the thesis of the lowering of the standard for nonobviousness
by the Federal Circuit).
68. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4, at 11-13 (documenting the "patent
explosion" in the last two decades).
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in which the inventor states in the written description:
"Damaged hair due to chemical treatments is a problem for
many women, especially for African-American women
whose hair is inherently delicate and prone to breakage. '69
Putting aside the truth of this statement, the interesting
question is why is it relevant. The reference to the hair of
African-American women emphasizes the universal
applicability of the invention and its benefits across racially-
defined markets.
However, certain inventions are targeted for the needs
of the racially delineated group. For example, several
patents are for the treatment of pseudofolliculitis barbae, a
skin condition resulting from ingrown hair follicles that is
particularly prevalent among African-American males. 70
These patents are specifically targeted to address a condition,
and a market need, that had been previously ignored or
underserved. Patents for certain types of razors and
scissors to deal with the problems of ingrown hair follicles
and sensitive skin conditions among the African-American
population also reflect this targeting of inventive activity.
The 2006 patent for a "Braid Removal device" offers a
final example of how racial categories mediate the boundaries
of racially defined markets.71 The patent is for an invention
that allows removal of braids from human hair in an
expedited fashion with minimal damage. The written
specification states:
[A]frican-Americans genetically have hair that resists the
formation of longer lengths. Still these longer length styles can
enhance the appearance. Accordingly, it is common for African-
American people to attach braids to their own natural hair.
These braids are formed of either natural hair (from any source)
or they are formed of a synthetic material and are attached to the
African-American's hair by weaving a length of the person's
natural hair into an end of the braid, which is then suspended
from the natural hair. Several strands of natural hair are used to
secure each braid. 72
69. U.S. Patent No. 6,264,121 col.2 11.59-62 (filed May 13, 1997).
70. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,775,530 (filed Jan. 6, 1989).
71. U.S. Patent No. 7,073,516 (filed Aug. 1, 2003).
72. Id. col.1 11.9-19.
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Despite this emphasis on the genetic inclinations of
African-American hair, the inventor clarifies that:
In use, a braid is cut at a location that is below where a person's
natural hair ends using the cutting device. The natural hair was
previously woven into the braid so as to secure it (the braid) in
position. This is well known in the art of adding braids to people's
hair. It is especially common among African-Americans, but can of
course be used with people of any race or ethnic background. 73
The inventor uses the example of African-Americans to
delineate the purpose and function of the invention, but is
also very quick to emphasize the universal applicability.
Given the asserted universal applicability, the interesting
question is why mention the racial category at all. The
answer seems to be that the racial category helps to
delineate the particular market that the invention serves
while also illustrating how the invention can be
universalized beyond the racial enclave. Racial categories
serve to advertise the market for the invention while
avoiding any narrowing of the claims to particular uses or
markets.
As in the case of biomedical and pharmaceutical
patents, racial categories in hair related patents serve to
support the patentability of the invention by demonstrating
the utility and potential nonobviousness of the invention in
meeting an unmet need in the marketplace. But the use of
racial categories serves to mediate the particular impetus
for the invention with its potentially universal marketability.
The hair related patents reflect once again the ways in
which background social factors like race can affect the
process of inventorship and of patenting. A similar pattern
can be observed in the four remaining categories of patents:
those involving skin color, those for toys, those for profiling,
and the miscellaneous category.
C. Patents Involving Skin Color
There were twenty-five patents in this category,
ranging from 1941 to 2004. The inventions covered by these
patents included methods for correcting skin color in
photographs and color television, methods for curing keloid
73. Id. col.3 11.47-53.
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scars and types of after shave and skin gels particularly
suitable to "Negro" or "African American" skin. The breakdown
by decade is as follows: 1940s: one; 1950s: zero; 1960s: one;
1970s: three; 1980s: four; 1990s: five; 2000s: eleven.
Since race consciousness has focused consistently on
skin color as both the basis for stigmatization and for
affirmation, the reference to Negro or African-American
skin color provides insights in how racial categories are
used in patent law.74 As with hair, skin color serves often as
a descriptive market to identify potential beneficiaries of
the invention. This descriptive use of a racial category aids
in both particularizing the invention, defining a specific
market enclave to be served by the invention, and
universalizing the invention, demonstrating how the
invention does not serve only the majority racial group in
the market. This latter use is arguably more recent, consistent
with the change in attitudes arising from the Civil Rights
Era. What is interesting is to gauge the stigmatizing uses of
the racial category. The patent documents do not explicitly
invoke stigmatizing or stereotypical uses of racial categories,
as, for example, we will see in the toy patents in the next
section.
However, many of the inventions implicitly suggest the
stigma resulting from racial categories. A striking example
of this implicit stigma is provided by the 1974 patent for
"Skin Depigmentation, 75 which shocked me when I first
discovered it for two reasons. First, the invention invoked
the history of passing and the necessity of passing through
blanching one's skin for the purposes of assimilation and
avoidance of discrimination. Second, the patent was issued
in 1974, ten years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act
and twenty years after Brown v. Board of Education,
providing stark evidence that the need for skin
depigmentation perhaps had not abated after the changes
74. See generally ROBERT BONAZZI, MAN IN THE MIRROR: JOHN HOWARD
GRIFFIN AND THE STORY OF BLACK LiKE ME 37-41 (1997); JOHN HOWARD GRIFFIN,
BLACK LIKE ME 190-92 (1960); IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 62 (1996).
For a recent account of passing and the effect on children, see BLISS
BROYARD, ONE DROP: MY FATHER'S HIDDEN LIFE-A STORY OF RACE AND FAMILY
SECRETS 472-74 (2007) (describing genetic tracing of ancestry by author to trace
racial roots).
75. U.S. Patent No. 3,856,934 (filed Jan. 22, 1973).
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in race consciousness. 76 Upon closer inspection of the
patent, however, I discovered that the written description,
while making use of a racial category, emphasized the
biomedical uses of the invention to aid those who had
suffered from certain debilitating skin diseases. The 1974
patent, as well as the other patents in this category,
illustrates the ambiguity in the use of racial categories for
inventions involving skin color.
The 1941 patent for an "Apparatus for Comparing,
Matching, or Detecting Colors" is the most striking of this
group of patents for illustrating the complex attitudes
towards skin color existing at the time and continuing onto
the present day.77 The inventor's written description paints
a broad scope for the invention:
This invention related to an apparatus for comparing, matching or
determining colors, such as human skin colors, paint colors, dye
and fabric colors, and all other colors, for the purpose of
identifying an unknown color or color shade of a 5 general color, or
comparing one color or shade of a color with another for the
purpose of determining and recording the specific shade or color
classification of any particular color shade with relation to a
standard or established color scale or an arbitrarily prescribed
scale.7 8
The apparatus allows for the side by side comparison of
a given color with a template that allows for the matching
and categorizing of a particular color shade. Descendants of
this device can be seen in hardware stores in order to
identify particular colors of paint to match existing samples.
Fans of the novelist Ralph Ellison, however, will
appreciate the juxtaposition of human skin color with paint
and fabric colors. In Ellison's novel Invisible Man,
published about twelve years after the grant of this patent,
the eponymous hero works in a paint factory where the
whiteness of the colors used to decorate the national
memorials in Washington, D.C. function as a metaphor for
racial homogeneity and the fear of blackness and difference
76. See JOSEPH L. GRAVES, JR., THE RACE MYTH: WRY WE PRETEND RACE
ExISTS IN AMERICA 86-87 (2004) (explaining the stereotypes that were associated
with skin color prior to the 1960s).
77. U.S. Patent No. 2,248,148 (filed Feb. 11, 1939).
78. Id. col.1 11.1-11.
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that haunt the novel. 79 The written description, however,
shifts quickly from the casual linking of human skin color to
paint color towards a more ominous turn in the following
paragraph:
The invention provides an apparatus designed and adapted for
general uses of the character described, but which is particularly
designed and adapted, in the exemplified form shown, for the
purpose of determining and indicating the skin colors of human
beings so as to furnish a valuable and important aid to police
authorities in the detection, apprehension and conviction of
persons guilty of criminal offenses, or, conversely, showing the
innocence of persons charged with such offenses.8 0
The invention could easily have been included in the
discussion below of patents having to do with sorting
identities and names since it serves as a tool for racial
profiling and identification. But I place the patent under
this category because of the blunt mention of skin color and
race, as indicated in the following discussion of how the
invention can aid in the organization of police records:
Such records are generally defective, however, in merely specifying
the general color of the individual as "black," or "white," for
example, which gives no exact information as to the color of the
individual's skin. A black man, or individual of the colored race,
for example, may be of any color ranging from a light brown to a
deep black. Furthermore, an individual classed as belonging to the
colored race may have a skin color as white as some individuals
among those classed as white, so that his color designation from a
racial standpoint is not an aid toward identification. Similarly
individuals of the white, yellow, brown and other races vary in
skin color, so that the general identification data of the character
commonly employed with respect to race and race color, does not
give satisfactory information in this respect.
My invention provides an apparatus and system of identification
which overcomes this objection and by means of which the exact
79. Here is an illustrative passage from the novel:
I watched him kneel and open one of the buckets, stirring a milky
brown substance. A nauseating stench arose. I wanted to step away.
But he stirred it vigorously until it became glossy white, holding the
spatula like a delicate instrument and studying the paint as it laced off
the blade, back into the bucket.
RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 199 (1952).
80. '148 Patent, supra note 77, col.l 11. 12-22.
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color or color shade of the skin of any individual may be determined
and a record thereof made, thus giving accurate information of a
valuable sort for use in apprehending and convicting persons guilty
of offenses against the law or proving the innocence of persons
taken upon suspicion or unjustly charged with such offenses.
My invention also provides an apparatus which may also be
used by manufacturers, military, naval and immigration authorities
and others in comparing, determining and recording colors, as
hereinbefore set forth and as hereinafter more fully described.8 1
The written description has been quoted in full to
provide the general flavor of this particular patent and to
emphasize how it reflects striking attitudes towards skin
color as a marker for race and tool for law enforcement.
Some of these attitudes continue to be demonstrated in the
patents for sorting identities of individuals, discussed
below.
The equivalence between human skin color and the
color of paints and dyes used on manufactures and textiles
has a parallel in the contemporary discussion over
trademark protection for colors as a form of trade dress.8 2
In that context, color serves as marker that cannot be
inherently distinctive but can gain distinction through
association or the creation of secondary meaning.8 3 This
discussion in trademark is paralleled in the patent area by
the recognition that human skin color may also be as
artificial or arbitrary as the paint applied to a commodity.
But the inventor of the 1941 patent demonstrates some
degree of ambiguity to the artifice of human color. The
concern with "exact information" on color and the close
connection drawn between one's color status and
membership in the "colored race" suggests that the inventor
views human skin color as in some ways essentializing, as
81. Id. col.1 1.50-col.2 1.28.
82. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1995)
(holding that color can be protected as a trademark only if it has acquired
distinctiveness in the marketplace through association with a company's
product or service).
83. The treatment of colors under trademark law is a vivid reminder of how
skin color itself can serve as a form of bankable property. For eloquent
treatment of this point, see Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1707, 1720-21, 1768 (1993) (demonstrating how skin color is a marketable
and commodifiable asset and how "protect[ion] of the property interest in
whiteness is achieved by embracing the norm of colorblindness").
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fundamental and immutable to the identity of the person
being sorted and categorized.8 4 Therefore, the skin color
patents demonstrate an ambiguity in thinking, perhaps
even a confusion, between color as artifice and color as
essence. Modern trademark law resolves that confusion in
the context of colored commodities in favor of artifice by
rejecting inherent distinctiveness for colors. The ambiguity,
however, continues in patent law as illustrated by three
subsets of skin color patents: (1) skin color and appearance,
(2) skin color as a marker for medical processes, and (3)
skin color as condition requiring treatment.
Several patents make reference to skin color as a
dimension of appearance which the inventor recognizes in
the construction of the invention. For example, there are
several patents involving color photography in which the
attributes of the photographic process or the new type of
film include the ability to accurately represent flesh tones,
specifically the skin color of African-Americans or Asian-
Americans.8 5 These inventions are touted as allowing the
user to more accurately capture natural skin colors. Unlike
the apparatus described in the 1941 patent, these inventions
treat skin color as a cosmetic condition which provides a
basis for defining the usefulness and value of the invention.
Other examples of these cosmetic patents include patents
for different types of cosmetic compositions and products
such as for after shave and skin care creams.8 6 Skin color
for these inventions indicates a cosmetic surface difference
which the particular inventor recognizes and incorporates
into the design and purpose of the invention.
A second set of inventions recognizes skin color as an
aspect of appearance but treats color as a marker for
identifying certain users of the product, much like racial
categories are used in the biomedical patents discussed
above. For example, a 1988 patent for "Devices and
Methods for Treating Memory Impairment," a continuation
84. See Richard R.W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2023,
2064-68 (2006) (analyzing the racial identities of corporations and identifying
"race" in "legal and extralegal objects").
85. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 3,705,762 (filed Sept. 20, 1971).




of a 1987 patent,8 7 describes a treatment for memory loss
that involves application of a pharmaceutical composition to
human skin.88 In describing clinical trials, the inventor
notes in the written description that "[lt]here does not
appear to be any difference in rate between Caucasian and
Negro skin at pH values of 8 and 9. However, differences
were observed between these two skin types in experiments
at lower pH values."8 9 Here, skin type serves as a
descriptive marker to help identify the efficacy of the
invention much like self-identified ethnicity is used in the
area of pharmaceutical invention.
While the cosmetic patents and the biomedical patents
support an understanding of skin color as appearance,
patents dealing with treatment of certain conditions involving
skin color illustrate a connection between skin color and
social status and perception. This connection, however, is
ambiguous. Skin color sometimes serves as an indicator of
disease, and the reference to skin color in these patents
highlights skin color as an aspect of surface appearance as
opposed to an essentialist dimension of identity. For
example, the 1970 patent for a "Method of Treating
Hyperpigmentation" covers "compositions of matter useful
as depigmenting agents and to processes for utilizing
such compositions in the treatment and control of
hyperpigmentation. 90 One part of the patented composition
was identified from the "leukoderma that was observed
in Negro workers [and] was traced to the use of
benzyloxphenol as an antioxidant in the protective rubber
gloves worn by the workers."91 Similarly in the 2000 patent
for a "Method and Apparatus for Detecting and Measuring
Conditions Affecting Color," skin color is a reference to
detect and identify disease:
The invention can afford good evidence of jaundice resulting from
medical conditions other than hyperbilirubinemia. Liver disorders
in adults and children produce jaundice, for example. These and
other skin color characteristics can be factors in diagnosing
additional diseases that affect skin color. It has been observed, for
87. See U.S. Patent No. 4,680,172 (filed Mar. 5, 1985).
88. U.S. Patent No. 4,765,985 (filed May 20, 1987).
89. Id. col.7 11.3-7.
90. U.S. Patent No. 3,517,105 col.1 11.24-27 (filed Apr. 6, 1966).
91. Id. col.2 11.3-6.
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example, that at least among dark skinned individuals, such as
African Americans or others of African descent, skin color is
affected by tuberculosis. 9 2
While these two and other patents present skin color in
descriptive terms and avoid treating color in essentialist
terms, the 1974 patent for "Skin Depigmentation" reflects a
more ambiguous approach to treatment of "hyperpigmented"
skin.93 While the written description begins with reference
to diseases of the skin, the inventor identifies why
depigmentation is sometimes desired:
This hyperpigmentation is generally viewed as cosmetically
undesirable and psychologically disabling. . . . It is also often
desirable to decolorize normally pigmented skin to generally
increase "fairness" of appearance or to blend hypopigmented areas
into surrounding normal skin, for example in the treatment of
generally dark-skinned people suffering from vitiligo.9 4
Here, the written description goes beyond mere
treatment of disease to treating "normally pigmented skin"
presumably to deal with the "psychologically disabling"
effect of skin color. 95 Two views of skin color are apparent in
this invention. The first is the conception of skin color in
purely cosmetic terms about appearance. The second,
however, appeals to an essentializing role of skin color
reflecting social stigma associated with dark skin tones and
societal preferences for fair colors. While such views would
not be surprising in the nineteenth century, they are quite
striking in a government document dated 1974. Even if the
language is archaic, reflecting outmoded attitudes in a
transition period of race consciousness, the salient question
is whether the government should sanction such
justifications for inventive activity through the patent
grant. This question, the focus of Part II of this Article,
becomes even more sharp in the context of patents
involving toys, which arguably illustrate the most striking
examples of racial stereotyping in the invocation of racial
categories.
92. U.S. Patent No. 6,129,664 col.17 11.24-32 (filed Sept. 29, 1997).
93. U.S. Patent No. 3,856,934 (filed Jan. 22, 1973).
94. Id. col.2 11.20-33.
95. Id. col.2 11.21-22, 29.
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D. Patents Involving Toys
There were sixty-three patents in this category, ranging
from 1863 to 2006. The inventions included card games
involving African and African-American culture, educational
tools to test knowledge of culture, teaching tools targeted to
skills in the African-American population, and a sundry of
dolls and apparatuses that incorporated stereotypes of the
African-American population. The breakdown by decades is
as follows: 1860s: three; 1870s: one; 1880s: four; 1890s: five;
1900s: four; 1910s: six; 1920s: nine; 1930s: two; 1940s: two;
1950s: zero; 1960s: one; 1970s: two; 1980s: two; 1990s:
seven; 2000s: fifteen. The inventions prior to the 1950s were
largely for toys that incorporated stereotypical images and
caricatures of African-Americans, such as an electric target
machine which included a "negro carrying a chicken" in
1940.96 A patent from 1969 was for a "Doll Having a
Plurality of Changeable Ethnic Features," including those
of a "Negro."97 The inventions in the 1990s and 2000s
covered educational card games and board games. The most
recent patent uncovered, from April 11, 2006, was for a
"Teaching Circumference Instrument," and its specification
referred to the reduced educational skill levels of African-
Americans and Latinos.98
Prior to the 1960s, the toy patents contain several
racial stereotypes that reflect then contemporary attitudes
of what caricatures consumers found amusing. In the first
of this series, an 1863 patent for an Automatic Dancer, one
of whose inventors was a fellow named appropriately
enough James Crow, describes the invention as a spring
toy, similar to what we would call a bobble head, which
would include "the figure of a negro or any other human
figure."99 The head of the figure, the inventors describe,
could be interchanged, "so that the head of the negro can be
removed and that of a clown put in its place." 100 The 1947
patent, the last in this series, was for a movable toy wagon
which included representations of human figures as
96. U.S. Patent No. 2,188,292 (filed Aug. 25, 1939).
97. U.S. Patent No. 3,419,993 (filed May 11, 1964).
98. U.S. Patent No. 7,025,593 (filed Nov. 20, 2003).




passengers. According to the inventor, "[t]he heads . . .of
these figures, in keeping with the idea of promoting
physical attractiveness, may be painted to simulate children
of diverse races, such as Caucasian, Mongolian, Negro, and
Malay races."101 The images of inclusiveness in the 1947
patent contrast with the stereotypes of the Negro buffoon
represented in the 1863 patent, and many of the patents
thereafter. For example, the 1907 patent entitled "Target"
is for a carnival game in which the target is a "negro's head,
at which the ball may be thrown. ' 10 2 The inventor of this
game informs us that:
The player aims to strike either eye of the head, and the target is
so constructed that the eye may be put out by the ball. In practice,
I construct both eyes so that each may be put out independently of
the other, and I also provide an opening in the negro's mouth
through which a ball may pass, and a net behind the opening to
catch the ball. 10 3
A 1940 patent for a target game included a target
"which may for example simulate a negro carrying a
chicken, or any other suitable design."'104 As the written
description provides:
We illustrate, however, means for reversing the movement of the
target structure in response to every hit so that the negro, if hit,
may reverse his direction of movement. It will be understood, of
course, that the housing 54 may simulate a negro, a hen house
being illustrated at A in Fig. 1. As soon as the target is initially
moved, with the negro moving toward the hen house, a successful
hit will cause him to reverse his direction of movement and leave
the hen house. This of course is merely one example of a practical
use of our invention. 10 5
The use of stereotypical imagery should not be too
surprising since games and toys illustrate the times.
Furthermore, the imagery in these mechanical shooting
games are not too far removed from the many stereotypes of
drug lords, pushers, and pimps that animate contemporary
101. U.S. Patent No. 2,419,872 col.2 11.20-24 (filed Dec. 22, 1945).
102. U.S. Patent No. 859,256 col.1 11.13-14 (filed Sept. 11, 1906).
103. Id. col.1 11.14-21.
104. U.S. Patent No. 2,188,292 col.3 11.6-8 (filed Aug. 25, 1939).
105. Id. col.4 11.6-17.
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video games. 106 But the prevalence of this imagery in patent
documents should be noted as examples of how inventorship
and the administrative review of patent applications readily
included ethnic stereotypes as illustrative examples of
invention.
The image of "children of diverse races" conjured in the
1947 patent contrasts the first set of patents to the second
set which begins with the 1969 patent for a "Doll Having a
Plurality of Changeable Ethnic Features."'107 While stereotypes
still persist, as the reference to "Caucasian, Mongolian,
Negro or Malay" races indicates, the written descriptions
suggest that the toys are designed with a broader, more
inclusive market in mind. According to the written
description, the inventor of the 1969 toy
contemplated that the ethnic doll may be made to represent four
basic races of universal man, namely the European white or so-
called Caucasian race; the Afro-American or Negroid race; the
American Indian race and the Oriental race. However, it will be
understood that the present invention is not limited to these four
races and that other types of human representation may be
exemplified in the ethnic doll of the present invention. 108
The inventor's discussion of the prior art is telling:
Dolls of the prior art each represent a particular ethnic group.
For example, separate dolls are utilized to represent the white or
the colored races and, similarly, separate dolls are used to
represent European, Oriental or Indian races. If it were desired to
acquaint a child with the various different races or ethnic groups,
this would therefore require a full set or complement of dolls. For
many parents or educational systems or schools this would be a
relatively expensive procedure.
In view the foregoing, it is an object of the present invention to
provide a single doll, hereinafter designated as an ethnic doll,
which can be made representative of the various races or ethnic
groups.
In accordance with the foregoing object, it is another object of
the present invention to provide an ethnic doll which can be
106. See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for
Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 25 n.37 (2004)
(discussing racial stereotypes in video games) (citing Erica Goode, With Video
Games, Researchers Link Guns to Stereotypes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at Fl).
107. See U.S. Patent No. 3,419,993 (filed May 11, 1964).
108. Id. col.2 11.38-46.
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manufactured at a relatively low cost and sold at a relatively low
price.
In accordance with the foregoing objects, it is a further object of
the present invention to provide a highly novel doll construction
which will have a high appeal to children of various different races
or ethnic groups. 109
The goal of inclusiveness continues post-1969 in patents
for other dolls that have multiple ethnic features, mancala-
like games, and board games celebrating Kwanzaa and
African-American civil rights leaders. 110
The theme of diversity and pluralism continues in the
last two patents in this set, a 2005 patent for "Teaching
Cylinder Instrument""' and a 2006 patent for "Teaching
Circumference Instrument"112 both granted to Gerald
Bauldock, Sr., an inventor in the field of education. Both
patents are for three dimensional visual aids that serve as
educational toys to help elementary age students learn the
relationships among size, shape, area, and volume. Each
invention is justified in terms of benefits to particular
ethnically or racially defined communities: "African
Americans and Latinos obtain college degrees at only half
the rate of white students. The partnerships between
government agency, industry, academia and private
organizations are trying to address these issues along with
many others. This invention provides a method for teaching
the geometric concepts of a circle."' 1 3
Although the patent claims are not limited by race, like
the pharmaceutical patents discussed above, these two
109. Id. col.1 11.14-34.
110. One unusual mention of race in this set of patents occurs in U.S.
Patent No. 3,940,863 (filed Dec. 14, 1973). The patent covered a "psychological
testing and therapeutic game device," id. at [54], which consisted of series of
game cards and dice designed to stimulate storytelling in a patient through
"iconographic stimuli." Id. at [57]. The patient would roll the dice and based on
the roll pick several game cards which included pictures of different things
(such as a racing car, a clown, a sarcophagus, or an animal) and of people. The
inventor states that images of "Negro" human figures can be substituted for the
images of people included in the card deck. The mention to race is casual in the
description, and the inventor seems to be suggesting that the card deck can
include images of different types of people. Id. col.4 11.16-20.
111. U.S. Patent No. 6,872,078 (filed Nov. 30, 2003).
112. See U.S. Patent No. 7,025,593 (filed Nov. 20, 2003).
113. Id. col.1 11.30-36.
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educational toys are defined in terms of unmet needs in
racially or ethnically defined target markets. The racial
categories serve to identify particular needs in addition to
the universal application and appeal of the invention.
The toy patents offer a snapshot of changing racial
attitudes, illustrating a sharp shift from the use of offensive
and predictable racial stereotypes to a more inclusive use of
racial categories, which may contain inherent stereotypical
dimensions. Serving both as a portrait of the social context
of inventorship and of changing social and cultural
attitudes, these inventions ranging from the prototypical
bubblehead to the contemporary educational toy
demonstrate the cultural history and background to the
issue of racial categories. As with the other set of patents
discussed in this section, the question of the normative
implications and importance to be given to the issue of
racial categories requires examining these patents in the
broader context of the instrumental goals of patent and of
race, the topic of Part II.
E. Patents for Methods of Sorting Identities and Names
There were seven patents in this category, ranging from
1920 to 2005. The breakdown by decade was 1920s: one;
1930s: zero; 1940s: one; 1950s through 1980s: zero; 1990s:
two; 2000s: three. The oldest invention, from 1920, was
"Means Employed in the Classification of Names," covering
a punch card system for sorting and classifying individuals
in a particular geographic area by particular characteristics,
such as race. 114 The most recent invention, in 2005, was for
a "Patterning System for a Selected Body Type and
Methods of Measuring for a Selected Body Type," targeted
to the garment industry in designing clothing for different
body types. 115
The 1941 patent for an apparatus to match and detect
colors discussed above 1 6 provides one example of an
invention whose function is to sort identities, at least
identity as reduced to skin color. An earlier example is
provided by the 1920 patent for a "Means Employed in the
114. U.S. Patent No. 1,343,755 (filed Sept. 30, 1919).
115. U.S. Patent No. 6,978,549 (filed June 5, 2002).
116. U.S. Patent No. 2,248,148 (filed Feb. 11, 1939).
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Classification of Names," an invention consisting of a series
of punch cards that would allow creators of gazetteers and
directories to sort individual citizens and residents by
characteristics such as last name, place of birth, or race. 117
The written description for this patent explicitly provides
the "negro race" as one example of a sorting characteristic.
The 1942 patent for "Selective Filing and Finding System"
covers a variant on this filing and sorting mechanism that
also expressly identifies race as one of the characteristics. 118
An electronic version of the punch card sorting mechanisms
is the subject of the 1998 patents for Attention
Brokerage. 119 This invention is a method for targeting
advertising based upon the bidding of the participant and
her self-identified characteristics, such as ethnicity. Finally,
the 2005 patent for a "Machine Learning Method" covers a
statistical method to assess the validity of a machine based
problem solving method in the context of medical
diagnosis.120  The written description provides racial
composition of the subject population, such as percentage
African-American, as one factor that can be coded in the
algorithm. 121
The last patent in this category, from 2005, is less
technical than the others in the set, covering a "Patterning
system for a selected body type and methods of measuring
for a selected body type." The invention covers a device
useful in the garment industry to determine standardized
body type. The written description could not be clearer:
This invention pertains to a patterning system and the creation
of a standard sizing system for the human body of the Black race.
This invention envisages body measurements, size designation,
and a patterning system for the Black human body, and
specifically, a patterning system incorporating different Black
body types in the design of ready-to-wear apparel, apparel fitting
forms and other articles of clothing, as well as other items worn on
the human body for protection or ornamentation. This invention
also envisages a method of measuring in order to form a more
117. '755 Patent, supra note 114.
118. U.S. Patent No. 2,294,903 (filed Oct. 5, 1938).
119. U.S. Patent No. 5,794,210 (filed Dec. 11, 1995).
120. U.S. Patent No. 6,917,926 (filed June 15, 2001).
121. Id. col.5 11.21-22.
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accurate patterning system for the Black human body type. 122
The inventor acknowledges the historic development of
different body types associated with ethnicity and the lack
of mannequins that reflect differential body type. The
invention proposes an ethnicity based solution to the
construction of mannequins and other devices in the garment
industry to fill in this gap in the garment industry. While
the written description for this 2005 patent does expressly
refer to the "Black race," the claims are neutral, speaking
broadly in terms of an "ethnicity solution" to the patterning
of body types. 123
Racial categories serve as a means of fixing identity as
the patents involving skin color illustrate. The few patents
discussed here illustrate that using race to assess identity
goes beyond skin color to include membership of a racial
group and body type. While the discussion of skin color
illustrates an ambiguity between race as an essentializing
quality and race as an element of surface appearance, the
patents discussed in this section suggest an essentialist
view of race in determining identity. Whether in using race
to target advertising or in defining body type, the patent
recipients use the racial category to capture some
predetermining fixed characteristic to aid in segmenting the
marketplace. In this way, racial categories serve a similar
function as in the other patents discussed above.
F. Miscellaneous
There were fifty-one patents in this category. The
inventions were hard to classify into discrete categories.
These patents included an 1842 invention for a plow, in
which the specification makes reference to "common negro
or laborer,"'124 methods for treating sickle cell anemia, 125
and the most recent, 'Method and System for a Distributed
Analytical and Diagnostic Software Over the Intranet and
Internet Environment."'126 The last invention permits
122. U.S. Patent No. 6,978,549 col.1 11.10-21 (filed June 5, 2002).
123. Id. at [57].
124. U.S. Patent No. 2,548 col.1 (issued Apr. 11, 1842).
125. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,482,571 (filed June 21, 1982).
126. U.S. Patent No. 6,917,829 (filed Aug. 9, 2001).
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remote diagnosis of disease in patients based on
characteristics such as the patient's race.
The patents represented here illustrate a wide range of
reference to racial categories. The 1842 patent for an
"Improvement in Plows" describes the invention in terms of
its efficacy as compared to "Negro" labor.127 The 1881
patent for a "Sponge-Cup"'128 and the 1890 patent for a
"Motion Clock" make use of racially stereotyped icons in
their design.129 The cup, for example, is a desk stand for
holding pens and other items that includes a "negro's head"
as the centerpiece. 130 The clock includes a mechanical
representation of a "negro banjoist.' 13 1 Some of the patents
cover inventions to diagnose or treat diseases that may
be particularly prevalent among the African-American
population, such as the patent for treating sickle cell
anemia 32 or preventing crib death. 33 In many of these
patents, racial categories serve as descriptive markers
summarizing background knowledge or assumptions that
are structured in racial terms. For example, in patents
covering methods for sorting DNA samples or populations
based on genomic information, racial categories serve to
delineate self-identified groups which are sorted or identified
through the patented methods. 134 What unites these patents
is the way racial categories are used casually to reflect
social understandings of how the benefits of invention may
be spread among segmented groups and markets.
The last patent in this set, one from 2005, in some ways
brings us back to the pharmaceutical patents with which
we began this discussion. A "Method and System for a
Distributed Analytical and Diagnostic Software Over the
Intranet and Internet Environment" covers a software
based method for tracking patients over a distributed
127. '548 Patent, supra note 124.
128. U.S. Patent No. 246,044 (filed Mar. 1, 1881).
129. U.S. Patent No. 439,854 (filed Dec. 12, 1887).
130. '044 Patent, supra note 128, 11.17-18.
131. '854 Patent, supra note 129,1.89.
132. U.S. Patent No. 4,482,571 (filed June 21, 1982).
133. See U.S. Patent No. 4,851,816 (filed Feb. 24, 1987).
134. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,291,182, at [57] (filed Nov. 10, 1999)
(methods, software, and apparatus for identifying genomic regions harboring a
gene associated with a detectable trait).
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environment such as within a hospital or across hospices. 135
The invention permits a medical practitioner to monitor a
large set of patients that are geographically dispersed based
on medical and demographic characteristics of the patient,
including race. 136 The inclusion of race as a characteristic
parallels the use of racial characteristics in biomedical and
pharmaceutical patents in the first category of inventions.
Racial categories serve to ensure that the inventor has
tailored the invention as needed to particular racially
defined markets. This tailoring, however, allows the
inventor to expand the scope of the invention in terms of its
applicability and novelty. Therefore, racial categories reflect
social attitudes about race but also serve a function in
defining the contours of the invention consistent with
patent law.
G. Summary
Racial categories in patent law serve many functions.
They can reflect background social attitudes towards race
that inform inventorship. These attitudes may be stigmatizing
or inclusionary. In addition, racial categories serve a function
within patent law allowing the inventor to tailor the
invention to racially defined markets and to identify the
unmet needs served by the invention. This section has in both
a descriptive and analytical way presented the uses of racial
categories in patent law. The next question is how to assess
the use of racial categories within the appropriate normative
framework. This question is the subject of Part II.
II. NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR ASSESSING THE USE OF
RACIAL CATEGORIES IN PATENT LAW
I have made the argument that racial categories do
arise in patent law as an empirical matter. The more
difficult question is what to make of this observation. In
this section, I first present the constitutional foundations
for analyzing race-specific patents. Against this constitutional
background, I develop a normative framework for evaluating
if and when race-specific patents should be granted.
135. U.S. Patent No. 6,917,829 (filed Aug. 9, 2001).
136. Id. col.2 11.26-30, col.3 11.14-23.
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A. Constitutional Framework for Race-Specific Patents
Racial categories in patent law may not seem as
insidious and as harmful as their use in Jim Crow laws or
in the employment or consumer sales context, in which
racial stereotyping, bias, and animus serve either individually
or collectively to deprive individuals and groups access to
key resources. 137 However, there is arguably at least a
symbolic harm that arises from the use of racial categories
in patent law, what Professor Timothy Holbrook has called
"the expressive impact of patents."'138 By countenancing
racial categories in the awarding of patents, the state has
acknowledged and aligned itself with racial stereotypes and
animus. As a remedy, the state would need to avoid the use
of racial categories in the patent document itself and in the
review of patent applications. But the harm is arguably
more than only expressive. If the granting of a patent by
the state promotes invention and innovation, either as an
actual consequence or as a justification, then the state is
supporting private decisions to create racially tailored
inventions through the patent grant. Such state action is
subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution to ensure that the racial
category is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
interest. 139
As an example of this normative quandary, consider the
patent for the chemical composition that constitutes BiDil.
The claim restricts use of the composition for treatment of
137. See JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 13-18 (1997) (analyzing different
forms and modes of racial discrimination, but not discussing the role of race in
intellectual property); ROY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW
MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 155-63 (2004) (detailing legacy of Jim Crow but
not discussing intellectual property).
138. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 573, 591-94 (2006) (describing expressive harms from patents).
139. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (affirming strict
scrutiny standard for state use of racial category). Strict scrutiny applies
whether the racial category is being used by the state government or the federal
government. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995)
(holding that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications whether adopted
by local, state, or federal government and hence overruling Metro Broad., Inc. v.
F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which applied intermediate scrutiny to racial
classifications used by Congress to promote diversity in broadcasting).
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hypertension in "black patients." Suppose a medical
practitioner administers the composition to a patient
without the authorization of Nitromed, the company to
whom the patent is assigned. If the medical practitioner is
sued for patent infringement, the court will have to
determine whether the patient who received the drug was
black. If the patient is black, then there has been
infringement of the patent. If the patient is not black, then
Nitromed would argue that the racial identity of the patient
is equivalent to "black" in order to succeed on its legal claim
for patent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 140
In this hypothetical law suit, the court would have to
construe the racial identity of the patient in order to
determine patent infringement much as courts had to
construe the racial identity of defendants to see if there had
been a violation of the myriad restrictions on activity under
the Jim Crow laws.
But the analogy to the Jim Crow laws is in many ways
a misguided one in the context of determining the
infringement of a race-specific patent claim. Under Jim
Crow laws, legal entitlements were allocated based on the
race with the intention of stigmatizing members of the
designated inferior race. In the BiDil context, there is no
intention to stigmatize. 141 Instead, the goal is to provide
incentives for the development of pharmaceutical products
140. Under the doctrine of equivalents, the patent owner can sue a party
who has used, made, sold, or offered to sell an invention that does not literally
fall within the language of the patent claims. The general test is that the
defendant's infringement accomplished the same function through the same
way to reach the same result as every element of the claim. See Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 (1997).
141. The BiDil patent and the push for personalized medicine more broadly
are examples of "liberal eugenics," in contrast with the racist or nativist use of
eugenics in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. Liberal
eugenics involves genetic selection or genetic manipulation for the purposes of
enhancing individual or even group attributes. See NICHOLAS AGAR, LIBERAL
EUGENICS: IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN ENHANCEMENT 5 (2004) (contrasting liberal
use of eugenics with the totalitarian and racist uses under the Nazi regime);
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE AGE OF
GENETIC ENGINEERING 75-83 (2007) (contrasting liberal eugenics with the "old
eugenics" and "free-market eugenics"). For an early, and simplistic, attempt to
deal with the ethical and constitutional issues raised by biotechnology, see John
B. Attanasio, The Constitutionality of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering:
Where Procreative Liberty and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1274, 1274-77 (1986) (formulating the issues in terms of a broad tension
between liberty and equality).
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that benefit neglected racial or ethnic groups. While it is
true that a court, in enforcing Nitromed's patent, can enjoin
unauthorized users from administering the drug to a black
patient but cannot enjoin the administration of the same
drug to a non-black patient, the distinction is arguably not
based on invidious discrimination. Instead, the analogy is
more closely made to the review of affirmative action
programs, which deny certain benefits to particular races in
favor of others. As with affirmative action programs, the
legality of racial categories in patent claims may rest on a
compelling state interest, analogous to the diversity
rationale recognized in the Grutter decision. 142
Designation of racial categories as either stigmatizing
or beneficial is only one of many potential problems raised
by racial categories in patents. The infringement example
assumed that the granting of the injunction by the court
based on consideration of race constituted state action. The
implicit assumption is that the patent infringement case
involving a racially specific claim would be analogous to the
enforcement of a racially restricted covenant as in Shelley v.
Kraemer143 or the allowance of peremptory challenges based
on race as in Batson v. Kentucky. 144 If patent rights, like
contractual rights, are private rights, 145 the superficial
conclusion would be that state action does not arise. But in
the infringement example, the court is seeking to exclude a
party based on the consideration of race analogous to the
injunction of sale of real property or to the exclusion of a
juror based on race. The black patient is in the same
position as an African-American purchaser of real property
in Shelley or the potential African-American juror being
stricken from the pool. In all three instances, the court is
complicit in the act of a private party seeking to deny a
142. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
143. 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
144. 476 U.S. 79, 100-01 (1986) (White, J., concurring).
145. For an analysis of patents as a set of contractual rights, see Shubha
Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain
Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1328-30 (2004) (critiquing
the social contract view of patents). See also Jay P. Kesan & Marc Banik,
Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment With
Incentives to Disclose Prior Art, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 23 (2000); Vincenzo
Denicolo & Luigi Alberto Franzoni, The Contract Theory of Patents, 23 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 365 (2000).
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benefit based on race. Therefore, even if a patent is a
species of private property, the existence of state action is
not tenuous. 146
However, the existence of state action in the recognition
of racial categories in patent law can readily be seen once
patents are recognized as private property rights granted
by the state. 147 In the case of BiDil, a patent examiner, an
agent of the state, reviewed the patent application and the
available prior art to determine that the use of the chemical
compound as limited to black patients is a protected right
owned by the patent applicant and secured by the state.
Race, therefore, was a factor in the determination by the
state to grant the right of exclusion secured through patent
law. In this context, however, the consideration of race is
different from the use of racial categories in affirmative
action programs, 148 in the grant of voting rights, 149 or in the
selection of employees, 50 where the racial identity of
persons being denied a benefit by the state is key to the
decision. In the case of BiDil, the racial identity of the
146. Arguably, the use of racial categories in the granting of a patent would
constitute constitutional state action under Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (finding state action when private discriminatory
conduct was "intertwined" with the state). But see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (granting of liquor license did not sufficiently implicate
the state in private discriminatory behavior to create constitutional state
action). The Court's analysis in Shelley v. Kraemer has been questioned, but the
case offers an important analogy for discussing the role of constitutional state
action in patent law since the public entity is quite clearly creating private
rights. For a discussion of the controversy over the Shelley decision, see Mark
D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95
CAL. L. REV. 451, 473-74 (2007) (justifying the decision in Shelley under the
Thirteenth Amendment which does not require state action). For a current
discussion of the distinction between state action and private action, see Mark
Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the Judicial Role: Some
Comparative Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 435, 442-43 (2002) (analyzing the
place of state action in the social democratic state); Cass R. Sunstein, State
Action Is Always Present, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 465, 465-67 (2002) (arguing that
state action also exists in the classic liberal state although the state assumes a
different set of affirmative obligations).
147. See Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1880) (the state's power
to regulate patented inventions); James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58
(1881) (Congress's power to define patent rights and make use of patents).
148. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, No. 05-908 (U.S. June 28, 2007) (slip op.).
149. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 235 (1962).
150. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313 (1986).
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patent applicant or inventor is irrelevant to the decision. 151
Instead, the state is making the decision to grant a right to
a specific individual in order to benefit a racially identified
group.
This description of state action applies as well to the
use of racial categories in the hair straightening and skin
de-pigmentation patents, where race enters in the
specification, but not the claims. When state action is
understood in this way, there are three possible responses.
One is to conclude that this use of racial categories is
different from the stigmatizing uses that arise in
conventional racially discriminatory state action because
the state is not directly targeting certain groups and
therefore the action is not problematic. The second is to
conclude that the state is internalizing and reinforcing
private animus and discriminatory attitudes and therefore
the state action is suspect. The third is to conclude that the
state's consideration of race can be beneficial if it corrects
differences that have been created through the use of racial
categories. This third approach is the most problematic
because it suggests that there are certain uses of racial
categories that may be beneficial, creating the difficult task
of distinguishing between beneficial and harmful uses of
racial categories. As I elaborate in the rest of this section,
distinguishing among these positions requires reconciling
the normative goals of patent law with the normative goals
of the use of racial categories by the state. These various
positions can be understood within the extremes of color
blind and accommodationist positions, presented in Part III
of this Article.
Assessing the three prognoses identified at the
beginning of this section (no harm, expressive harm, equal
protection violation) requires addressing the normative
foundations for patent law and for the use of racial
categories. The remainder of this section analyzes both of
these normative foundations by focusing first on patent law
and second on race. My goal is to juxtapose three normative
justifications for patent law-incentive theory, market
theory, and cultural theory-with liberal and critical theories
151. For a discussion of racial restrictions on patenting that were imposed
in the nineteenth century, see BUTLER, supra note 14, at 59.
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of racial categories. 152 By juxtaposing these theories, I
present a roadmap for assessing the use of racial categories
documented in Part I. This roadmap will be the basis for
what I call the critical cultural approach to racial categories
in patent law presented in Part III.
B. The Perspective of Patent Law
Justifications for patents are founded in three broad
approaches: incentive theory, market theory, and cultural
theory. I will present each theory with some implications
for the patents described in the previous section. My point
in this section is to show that the implications of each of
these theories of patent law for race-specific patents depend
on one's theory of the appropriateness of using racial
categories. The following subsections present theories of
racial categories and a synthesis of the three patent theories
with two theories of racial categories: liberal theories and
critical theories. The synthesis yields six possible policy
positions which will guide my policy analysis of race-specific
patents in Part III.
1. Incentive Theory. Patents are typically understood as
providing an incentive for potential inventors and innovators
to develop a useful, novel, and nonobvious process or
product. 153 Put most starkly, the promise of market
exclusivity, and the resulting economic rents, provided by
the patent grant attracts individuals to allocate resources to
the process of invention. 154 With this goal in mind, Congress
calibrates the patent grant through the terms of patent
such as to structure incentives to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,"' 55 following the constitutional
152. For background on liberal and critical theories of race, see Kimberle
Crenshaw et al., Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (1996), reprinted in THE CANON OF AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT 887, 889-97 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds.,
2006).
153. See Lemley, supra note 15, at 135.
154. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1817-18 (2007) (discussing
problem of exclusivity in defining property rights over information); Mark F.
Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305,
326-27 (1992) (describing rent dissipation theory).




According to the incentive theory, whether racial
categories in patent law are desirable depends on the
meaning of progress. 156 If progress means pure economic
returns to the total wealth in society, then racial categories
arguably should be largely irrelevant to the grant of a
patent. 15 7 The scope of a patent should rest on the economic
benefits of an invention which need not be correlated with
any racial dimensions or uses. This last point implicitly
assumes a liberal economic view of racial categories, which,
as I discuss below, assumes that race is a veil that masks
meritorious factors that support economic development and
progress.158 Under this liberal economic assumption, the
use of racial categories is either an unfortunate use of
language or a distraction from the goals of economic growth.
Progress, however, may also be consistent with the use
of racial categories. If the goal of maximizing economic
wealth is distorted through racial discrimination, then the
patent grant could arguably be used to target inventive
activity aimed at correcting racial discrimination. 159 For
156. See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause:
Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress's Intellectual Property Power,
94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1835-36 (2006) (presenting a judicial theory of progress in
the intellectual property clause); Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property,
Innovation, and Social Progress: The Case Against Incentive Based Arguments,
26 HAMLINE L. REV. 601, 628 (2003) (critiquing an incentives based theory of
intellectual property).
157. This statement follows from the argument that race is irrelevant to
productivity and racial discrimination will be rooted out through competitive
markets without the intervention of the state. For the classic statement of this
argument in the economics literature, see GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION 82-107 (1957). For a popular version of this argument that
parallels the classic economic argument, see GRAVES, supra note 76, at 203-07.
For a response by economists to these arguments, see William A. Darity, Jr. &
Patrick L. Mason, Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market, in RACE,
LIBERALISM, AND ECONOMICS 194-200 (David Colander et al. eds., 2007).
158. The liberal theory of race is delineated below in Part II.C.1. The view
that race is a veil is an example of color blindness. For an analysis of this
position, see GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 112-13
(2002) (contrasting what he calls race blindness with race egalitarianism).
159. See LouRY, supra note 158, for a discussion of this position, which he
calls "race egalitarianism." For the classic, economic statement that some
government intervention may be needed to correct racial discrimination, see
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR
MARKETS 3-33 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973).
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example, if medical research has historically ignored the
study of diseases prevalent among certain minority groups
with the result that aggregate economic wealth is less than
it could be, then the patent grant can be structured with
the use of racial categories to correct this incorrect
allocation of resources. 160 A similar argument could be
made for the race-friendly toys and racially targeted hair
and skin products discussed in the previous section.
According to this argument, racial categories in patent law
are a corrective measure to redress discrimination in the
choice of inventive activities. While this argument has been
couched in terms of wealth maximization, a similar
argument would follow if progress were understood in
terms of equity as well as wealth maximization. 16 ' Under
this broader criterion for progress, racial categories in
patent law serve a redistributive function to promote
inventions to meet underserved and unrepresented needs.
Simplistic in its terms, the incentive theory provides the
most straightforward understanding of racial categories;
they are desirable if consistent with progress in the useful
arts. The difficult normative work arises in how progress is
understood, particularly in racial terms. According to the
incentive theory, the assessment of racial categories in
patent law depends on the connection between racial
categories and the appropriate measure of progress, which
reflects the normative view of race more broadly.
2. Market Theory. As a subset of incentive theory, the
market theory of patents views the patent grant as an
instrument to create incentives for the commercialization of
invention, a tool not solely for invention but also for
160. For the history of racial bias in scientific research and
experimentation, see JOHN P. JACKSON, JR., SCIENCE FOR SEGREGATION: RACE,
LAW, AND THE CASE AGAINST BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 19-42 (2005);
EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 92
(1995); BONNIE P. SPANIER, IM/PARTIAL SCIENCE: GENDER IDEOLOGY IN
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY (1995) (collecting essays on gender bias in science);
WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 270-71
(1994) (history of scientific and politicized analysis of race); HARRIET A.
WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL
EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES To THE PRESENT
105-07 (2006); Weijer & Crouch, supra note 43.
161. See LOURY, supra note 158, at 115-17 (discussing egalitarian
arguments against color blindness).
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innovation. 162 However, market theory is not simply an
explanation based on incentives. Under the terms of market
theory, the patent grant should be designed to reflect
market needs and the ability of the patent owner to shape
the commercial path of innovation. While the incentive
theory assesses patent law solely in terms of the returns to
invention as a lure for inventive activity, the focus of
market theory is on how patent law reflects the forces of
demand and supply in the marketplace. The incentive
theory is sometimes referred to as an ex ante theory of
intellectual property because of the theory's focus on
activities prior to the making of the invention. By contrast,
the market theory is referred to as an ex post theory
because of the emphasis on how the invention is
disseminated after it is made. 163
Assessing racial categories under the market theory
requires understanding both the connection between patents
and progress and the connection between commercialization
and race. The market theory, standing alone, would imply
that the details of patent law are driven largely by
considerations of commercialization. For example, the market
theory would imply that secondary considerations should
play a greater role in the nonobviousness determination
than considerations of technical novelty.16 4 Furthermore,
the market theory would place greater emphasis on
licensing practice as the means to disseminate inventions,
implying for example a narrower role for defenses to
infringement, such as experimental use or repair. 165 As
applied to racial categories, the critical question under the
market theory is the role of race in defining markets for the
purpose of commercialization. To the extent that the use of
race is antithetical to the goals of commercialization, racial
categories should be avoided in the patent grant. However,
if race-specific markets are an appropriate avenue for
162. See F. Scott Kieff, IP Transactions: On The Theory and Practice of
Commercializing Innovation, 42 Hous. L. REV. 727, 743 (2005); Kitch, supra
note 15, at 271.
163. See Lemley, supra note 15.
164. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards:
Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 805 (1988).
165. See F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property
Rights and The Norms of Science-A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U.
L. REV. 691, 693 (2001).
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commercialization, then race-specific patents are an
appropriate tool to promote such markets.
The connection between race and markets is largely a
question of the normative framework for racial categories,
to be discussed in more detail below under liberal and
critical perspectives on race. 166 In terms of the normative
foundations of patents, the appropriateness of racially
defined markets is parallel to the issue of how broadly or
narrowly commercialization should be understood. If one
accepts the view that patent law requires the
commercialization of every possible variation of an
invention, then defining markets in terms of race would be
as appropriate as defining markets in terms of any other
possible use of the invention. 167 However, if one accepts the
view that patent law mandates non-commercialized spaces,
sometimes referred to as the public domain, then the
question becomes whether commercialization based on race
goes too far.168
Scholars have debated the scope of commercialization in
patent law in terms of cumulative innovation, sometimes
referred to as the "shoulders of giants" effect. 169 According
to this view, innovators need to borrow from predecessors in
order to perfect inventions and promote progress. If the
scope of patent commercialization is too broad, current
166. For an analysis of the racially defined markets and commercialization
based on racial targeting, see EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS,
WHEN MARKETS FAIL: RACE AND ECONOMICS 444-85 (2006) (describing the
market for counterculture). For a striking example of race-conscious
commercialization, see Felicia R. Lee, Network for Blacks Broadens Its
Schedule, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007, at El (describing programming on Black
Entertainment Television).
167. See, e.g., David Dante Troutt, A Portrait of the Trademark as a Black
Man: Intellectual Property, Com modification, and Redescription, 38 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1141, 1149-51 (2005) (providing an example of how a human person can
become commodified through intellectual property law through an allegorical
business plan). For an exegesis of the trend toward commodification, see
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 79-102 (1996) (presenting
conflict between markets and human flourishing).
168. See David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 2003 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 482 (2003) (advocating public sphere of intellectual
property counter to commodified uses); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse
on Public Domains, 55 DuKE L.J. 783, 783-84 (2006) (identifying complexities of
public domain).
169. Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 29, 31.
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patent owners may be hesitant in licensing future innovators
for fear of obsolescence or competition. Therefore, the
argument goes, the scope of commercialization needs to be
narrowed, for example, through such doctrines as
experimental use. 170 The implications of this argument for
racial categories are not immediately clear. There is no
reason to think that cumulative innovation would be
directly impeded by racially tailoring an invention. But
there is the risk, however, that racial categories may lead to
segregation of research efforts along racial lines. 17' To the
extent that allowing racial categories leads to divisions of
research based on white populations and research based on
black populations, as may perhaps happen in the fields of
biomedical or pharmacogenetic research, the use of racial
categories may inhibit cross fertilization and synergies
among researchers and innovators. 172 In other words, race-
specific patents may lead to the anti-commons problems
reported by policy makers and scholars with too many
patents too narrowly drawn being issued to too many
disparate players. 73
To summarize, to the extent the market theory is
viewed as a subset of the incentive theory, the analysis of
the previous subsection applies. However, the market
theory introduces unique problems of its own, such as the
problems created by allowing patents to be commercialized
too broadly. Finally, just as the assessment of racial
categories under the incentive theory rests on the
connection between race and progress, so the assessment
under the market theory rests on the connection between
170. See, e.g., Tom Saunders, Case Comment, Renting Space on the
Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the Future of the Experimental Use Doctrine,
113 YALE L.J. 261, 262-65 (2003) (identifying values and limits of the
experimental use doctrine).
171. For an example of how far individualized genetics can be taken, see
Mark Rothstein, Legal Conceptions of Equality in the Genomic Age, 25 LAW &
INEQ. 429, 433-37 (2007) (arguing that individual genetic variation needs to be
factored into equity analysis).
172. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Legal Constraints on the Use of Race in
Biomedical Research: Towards a Social Justice Framework, 34 J.L. MED. &
ETHIcs 526, 529-31 (2006) (documenting current incentives for race based
research and its prevalence).
173. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99
(1998) (defining anticommons in scientific research).
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race and commercialization efforts.
3. Cultural Theories. Patent law in particular, and
intellectual property more broadly, have been justified as
instruments to promote civil society by creating a system of
economic and property rights that allow for civic
participation and market engagement. 174 The emphasis
from this perspective is not on the financial incentives to
create and to commercialize inventions, but on the
development of and access to knowledge. Yochai Benkler,
for example, speaks about social production and the role of
intellectual property laws in promoting collaboration among
creative peoples, both makers and users. 175 The rules of
patent law should be designed to facilitate such
collaboration and the social accumulation of knowledge.
Madhavi Sunder, to provide another example, has written
on the parallels in intellectual property and identity politics
and highlighted how the confluence of economic, political,
and civil rights shape the contemporary debate over the
structure of legal systems. 176 These two scholars, and
several others,177 have broadened the stakes for intellectual
property, and their ideas demonstrate how patents are
instrumental in the formation of civil society grounded in a
knowledge-based economy.
As a normative framework, cultural theories would
assess patent laws in terms of the promotion of the values
of openness, political freedom, and economic justice.
Promoting progress, under the cultural theories of patents,
implies not the maximization of wealth or the
commercialization of inventions, but assuring access to
knowledge and resources necessary for human flourishing
and community development. With respect to the racialized
patents, cultural theories would suggest that the use of
racial categories would be justified if they served these
humanistic goals. In this regard, Professor Holbrook's
notion of the expressive impact of patents resonates. The
174. See Shubha Ghosh, Globalization, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge,
17 COLUM. J. AsIAN L. 73, 78-81 (2003); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and
a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285 (1996); Peter K. Yu, The
International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 828-32 (2007).
175. BENKLER, supra note 16, at 91-130.
176. Madhavi Sunder, IP 3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 272-74 (2006).
177. See Aoki, supra note 16, at 742; Chon, supra note 16, at 2830.
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presence of racial categories in patents, a document issued
by the Federal government, demonstrates an endorsement
for a particular view of race. If the use of race is
disparaging or stereotypical, such as with the reference to
Negroes stealing chickens, or through the more than
occasional reference to a racial epithet, then the
government is acknowledging the background racism and
stereotypes that would otherwise be voiced privately. If the
patent document, on the other hand, evokes positive views
of African-Americans, affirming certain cultural tropes and
artifacts from a racially defined community, then the
government endorsement serves a positive goal that
promotes the inclusion of diverse groups. Assessing racial
categories in patent law requires distilling the message
being sent by the patent. If the message is one of openness,
political freedom, and economic justice, then cultural
theories would endorse the use of racial categories in patent
law.
But this analysis assumes that patents serve largely a
symbolic function as a signal of specific positions that the
state should or should not endorse. 178 However, the patent
instrument is inherently a tool for openness. Protection
through a patent substitutes for protection through
secrecy. 179 If patents sending negative signals about race
should be suppressed or denied, then the government would
be encouraging secrecy. Professor Holbrook's notion of the
expressive impact implicitly assumes that denying a patent
means that the troubling invention, attitude, or signal will
disappear from the public realm. While this is true in the
trivial sense that the expression will not be publicized, it is
not true that it will be converted into a more positive signal.
If Professor Holbrook is correct that patents have an
expressive impact, then what the government should do in
some instances is publicize the negative message and
counter it. Just as the answer to negative speech is more
positive speech, so the answer to bad patent signals is
positive patent signals and not the relegation of improper
uses of racial categories to the domain of secrecy.' 80
178. See Holbrook, supra note 138, at 596-600.
179. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493-94 (1974)
(reconciling trade secret and patent protection).
180. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2363 (2000) (construing "the marketplace
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What this suggests is that assessing the use of racial
categories rests on more than the mere suppression of bad
signals. Instead, patent law needs to promote openness,
freedom, and justice through greater access to the process of
how patents are assessed and to greater dialogue about the
meaning of race. Here, we move beyond the scope of this
Article to larger questions of how to structure the system of
patent prosecution and review.' 8l  For the narrower
purposes of this Article, the argument I am making here is
that cultural theories of patent need to consider institutions
other than the patent system to assess patent law.' 8 2 If
patents are a form of expression and state endorsement,
then the meaning of racial categories in patents depends on
the meaning of race within other institutions, such as the
gaming establishments or the schools or the health care
facilities or the shopping centers in which the patented
inventions will be practiced. Racial categories in patents
need to be assessed, therefore, against the broader culture
within which the inventions are made and used. Therefore,
even more than under the incentive and market theories of
patents, the assessment of racial categories in patent law
depends upon addressing contested theories of race within
culture more broadly.
To summarize: the incentive theory, the market theory,
and cultural theories would assess the use of racial
categories in patent law in terms of wealth maximization,
the benefits of commercialization, and the creation of open
civil society respectively. But understanding the propriety
of using racial categories under each of these theories
requires understanding, in turn, the connection between
race and wealth creation, race and markets, and race and
culture. In order to complete this part of the puzzle, I turn
next to the issue of liberal and critical theories of race.
C. The Perspective of Liberal and Critical Race Theories
Both liberal and critical theories of race demonstrate a
commitment to principles of nondiscrimination, democracy,
of ideas" for the First Amendment).
181. See generally JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4.
182. This point is an illustration of the embeddedness of economic, and
legal, institutions within culture. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and
Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481-510 (1985).
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and equal treatment. The two theories differ, however, in
the ability of the institutions of market and democracy to
correct for historically rooted and longstanding fears and
animus defined in racial terms. 8 3 In this section, I present
liberal and critical theories of race which will provide the
basis for assessing the use of racial categories in patent
law. In the immediately following section, I synthesize
these theories of race with the theories of patents discussed
in the previous section to develop an analytical taxonomy of
approaches for assessing the patents described in Part I.
1. Liberal Theories of Race. Color-blindness is the
hallmark of liberal theories of race. 8 4 But there are shades
of color-blindness. At the ideal level, proponents of liberal
theories aspire to a world in which decisions about the
allocation of market resources and the distribution of
political power are made without any consideration of race.
What this means in practice is that such decisions are made
on the merits of the situation and the character of the
individual participants. A less idealistic view would
recognize that power often, perhaps always, plays some role
in the functioning of markets and of politics, but the
exercise of economic and political power needs to be absent
of racial considerations. Color-blindness does not, however,
mean social homogenization of either skin tones or culture.
Most liberal theorists of race would celebrate a healthy
pluralism, the clich6d melting pot.1 8 5 But such diversity in
the public realm is a reflection of individual group identity
rather than subordination of or discrimination against
groups. There is, however, a sense that once racial
difference is understood as irrelevant to individual decision-
183. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S, at 99-108 (1986) (describing the
transformation of racial consciousness in the 1960s against the background of
national identity and racial animus).
184. See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 113, 118, 182-83
(1992) (exploring the implications of Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson and casting a skeptical eye on "benign racial sorting"); John A. Powell,
The Colorblind Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Categories Reconsidered, 31 U.S.F.
L. REV. 789, 798-800 (1997) (advocating a multiracial justification for the use of
racial categories). For a discussion of race and the design of technology, see
Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1130, 1154-59 (1999).
185. See Peter H. Schuck, The Perceived Values of Diversity, Then and Now,
22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1915, 1927-28 (2001).
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making in any context, racial difference will go away to be
replaced with a mutual respect for individual autonomy and
self-creation.
Liberal theories of race retreat from the principle of
color-blindness in many instances. In defining the cultural
sphere, race can arise as a healthy and much needed
ingredient to the promotion of a vibrant and healthy
workforce and marketplace. 8 6 Race may also be an element
in remedies for past discrimination and continuing
obstacles that are historical relics from less liberal times.'8 7
Therefore, in the affirmative action debate, race can be a
factor to be considered in some public decision-making but
only in a narrowly tailored remedial fashion to correct for
specifically identified instances of past group discrimination.18 8
Furthermore, race can be used sometimes in the university
admissions context to promote the goals of diversity,
specifically in public service professions such as law. 8 9
Race, however, is a constitutional suspect class and only
very narrow policy justifications can support its use. 90
Economist Glenn Loury has written about the
complexities posed for liberal theories of race by the
principle of color-blindness. 191 In the 1980s, Professor Loury
was a staunch conservative with respect to race, advocating
a strict color-blind position that mandated self-help and the
186. Judge Alex Kozinski illustrated this point vividly when he described an
affirmative action plan in Seattle designed to racially integrate elementary
schools as giving "the American melting pot a healthy stir without benefiting or
burdening any particular group." Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 1162, 1196 (9th Cir. 2005) (Judge Kozinski's concurrence to
majority opinion upholding the plan). The United States Supreme Court
reversed the decision, with Chief Justice Roberts asserting the color-blind
position: "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race." Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007).
187. See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(adopting strict scrutiny for use of racial classifications by federal government
and remedying past discrimination may serve as a compelling interest if
narrowly tailored).
188. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-32 (2003); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003).
189. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
190. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
191. LOURY, supra note 158, at 8-11.
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avoidance of the culture of victimhood. 192 Recently, Professor
Loury has made an about-face for pragmatic reasons and
has espoused a critique of strict color-blindness. In his The
Anatomy of Racial Inequality, given as the W.E.B. DuBois
Lecture at Harvard in 2000, Professor Loury posits three
axioms: (1) race is socially constructed; (2) race is not an
essentialist category, but a social artifact; and (3) as a
socially constructed category, race has resulted in the
creation of stigma and prejudicial attitudes harmful to
racialized groups. 193 In addition to these axioms, Professor
Loury identifies three contexts in which racial categories
are used: (a) policy implementation, (b) policy evaluation,
and (c) civic construction of a nation's shared purpose and
common fate.194 He argues that color blindness is
appropriate only for public decision making in the third
context, but not in the first two. 195 Specifically, racial
categories should not be considered in the broad mandate of
an open and inclusive society but should be considered in
the areas of policy implementation and policy evaluation in
order to reach the goal of an open and inclusive society. 196
Professor Loury presents a pragmatic approach to color-
blindness, one that acknowledges the failure of a strict
color-blind position to combat continuing stereotypes and
animus based on race. The approach almost, but not quite,
echoes the critical theory position presented below: almost,
because of the emphasis on the recognition that race
continues to be debilitating; not quite, because of the appeal
to assimilation. Liberal theories of race falter around the
principle of assimilation. 197 On the one hand, assimilation
supports the goal of inclusion and leads to fairness and
equality of opportunity. On the other hand, assimilation can
deny difference by mandating that individuals comport
192. Professor Loury's early conservative position was stated in GLENN C.
LOURY, A New American Dilemma, in ONE BY ONE FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS
AND REVIEWS ON RACE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICA 51, 51-52 (1995). An
about face can be seen in the article, Glenn C. Loury, How to Mend Affirmative
Action, 127 PUB. INT. 33-43 (1997).
193. LOURY, supra note 158, at 5.
194. Id. at 148-49.
195. Id. at 150-52.
196. See id. at 152-54.
197. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney Lopez, 'A Nation of Minorities" Race, Ethnicity,
and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 993 (2007).
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their distinctiveness and cultural affiliations to the will of
the majority. Pragmatic turns appeal to concepts like
diversity or pluralism or phrases like "rainbow republicanism"
to accommodate difference to the color-blind principle. 198
Such accommodation leads to charges of balkanization and
fragmentation of public spaces and the call for a return to
strict color-blindness. 199 Professor Loury's approach attempts
to recognize the use of racial categories as an instrument to
reach certain policy goals while retaining an open, inclusive
civic sphere demarcated along assimilationist lines.
The connections between race and wealth maximization,
between race and markets, and between race and culture
can be understood against the liberal goal of assimilationism.
Under the color-blind principle, in both the strict and
pragmatic forms, race should be irrelevant to the goals of
wealth maximization and, therefore, needs to be expunged
as a category. 20 0 More pragmatic forms, however, would
recognize that racial animus and the persistence of past
discrimination requires consideration of race in the
implementation of particular policies, such as admissions or
the award of other public benefits. 201 Therefore, the
intersection of wealth maximization and color-blindness
would support the use of racial categories to reach the goals
of corrective justice to remedy past harms.
Liberal theories of race would find little room for racial
categories in the market sphere. In such an arena, willing
buyers and willing sellers should coordinate solely in order
to engage in voluntary, mutually enhancing transactions. 202
While liberal theorists would not deny that the specter of
race can appear in the market sphere, the animus arising
from race can be cured through proper implementation of
race conscious policies in the public sphere through anti-
discrimination laws or through race conscious policies in
198. Kathleen Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1714,
1716 (1988) (arguing against a civic republican view of social pluralism in favor
of a structure of private voluntary associations that are independent from the
purview of the state).
199. See generally Lopez, supra note 197.
200. See supra text accompanying note 157.
201. See supra text accompanying note 159.
202. See supra text accompanying note 158.
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providing benefits, such as education.20 3 When racial
pluralism arises in the market arena, for example, through
the development of enclave or ethnic markets, within which
members of certain racially or ethnically defined groups
trade with each other, racial categories are a useful tool to
promote diversity and cultural pluralism in the
marketplace. 20 4 Such appeal to "rainbow commercialism"
would support the use of racial categories as brands, or
trademarks, much like the use of colors as a trademark
upon the showing of secondary meaning, through which
sellers and buyers can signal to each other their willingness
to engage in beneficial trades. 205 Racial signals of this sort
serve to invite inclusion rather than impose exclusion. As a
result, the civic sphere, which includes the market, is
enriched.
Finally, when liberal theories of race connect racial
categories with culture, the result is the promotion of
diversity. 206 The appeal to diversity does not arise from a
rejection of the color-blindness principle, but as a necessary
complement to the goal of assimilationism. If the difficult
truth is that it is illiberal to abolish difference, whether
racial or otherwise, while moving towards the goal of
assimilation and inclusiveness, then difference is
accommodated by creating a zone within the civic sphere in
which difference can flourish but not intrude into the
workings of politics or the market. This sphere of cultural
diversity is one in which racial categories can be tolerated,
even encouraged, as individuals can play out their racial or
ethnic identities through celebration of festivals and
displays of costumes and customs. The cultural sphere
provides an escape hatch from the color-blind realm that
203. See supra text accompanying note 159.
204. See, e.g., Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale?,
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1521, 1530 (2003) (although not using the term
''rainbow commercialism," illustrating the point through an analysis of ethnic
enclaves and markets in major global cities). For a striking example of this
phenomenon, see American Multicultural Marketing, http://american
multicultural.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
205. See supra text accompanying note 172; see also SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO
OWNS CULTURE?: APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN LAW 151 (2005)
(proposing trademark-like protection for culture identities in commodified
public spaces).
206. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 23-31 (1995);
AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE: THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY 149-52 (2006).
2008] 467
468 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
allows markets and politics to function in a seemingly
neutral manner. Differences are recognized with the
understanding that they be put aside in the boardroom and
the political arena.
These positions are summarized in Table One,
presented in Part II.D, below. However a complete
understanding of how racial categories function within
patent law requires considering critical theories of race as
well. We explore critical theories of race in the next section.
2. Critical Theories of Race. As a general proposition,
critical theories of race express skepticism of the overly
optimistic goal of assimilationism that is the hallmark of
liberal theories. 20 7 The criticism is aimed in part at the
assumption within liberal theories of the neutrality of
assimilation, which serves to mask the way in which
economic and political power continues to be distributed on
racial lines even after the remedies provided by civil rights
laws.208 Many scholars emphasize how such remedies have
failed to provide genuine economic and political power to
those who have been subordinated by racial animus and
stereotypes. 209  The goal of critical scholarship is to
transform legal institutions in a way that implements the
principle of anti-subordination and engenders genuine
207. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 771-72 (2002).
208. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 1049, 1065-67 (1978) (presenting a general model of antidiscrimination
law that legitimizes discrimination); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism:
The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1077, 1091-1101 (1991) (critique of voting rights legislation in securing
political power); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1129-
31 (1997) (equal protection analysis failing because status-based hierarchies
reconstitute themselves in response to the law).
209. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518, 524-27 (1980)
(explaining the Brown decision in terms of interest convergence between
majority and minority groups which subsequently diverged); Derrick Bell,
Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 372-73 (1992) (advocating a realist
approach to racial politics and subordination); Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 166-67 (advocating the incorporation of anti-sexist norms in
the debate over race); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-
Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 28-35 (1991).
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empowerment rather than assimilation within an economic
and political structure that is majoritarian and exclusive
while purporting to be assimilationist and inclusive. 210
Critical theorists contrast with liberal theorists on two
counts. First, liberal theories demonstrate a commitment to
liberty, particularly freedom from discriminatory conduct
based on racial identity.211 However, such freedom may not
translate into actual opportunity and a more equal division
of resources as anti-discrimination norms become construed
and applied narrowly to permit the efficient functioning of
markets and governments. The liberal ideal of assimilation
assumes that once formerly subordinated groups are free to
participate in markets and politics, the forces of competition
will allow the groups and individuals within them to
flourish. But this vision assumes that competition will
function in a neutral, equalizing manner when in fact the
forces of competition may lead to stratification. 212 Second,
liberal theories espouse a commitment to equality between
the races, but critical theories demonstrate that the liberal
notion of equality is formalistic, ignoring how historical and
social context can create disparities among individuals that
otherwise appear equal before the law.21 3 Critical theorists
seek substantive equality and a distribution of economic
210. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 5-7 (1991);
see also Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist
Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice-Some Observations and Questions of an
Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993, 998-99 (1991) (explaining how
interest group politics undercuts the values of assimilation).
211. See Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 833, 835 (2001) (describing "simple discrimination" as grounded in an
individual right to be free from discriminatory conduct).
212. See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET
DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 11-12 (2003)
(describing ethnic tensions in the Philippines, exacerbated by markets).
213. See Siegel, supra note 208, at 1120; Linda S. Greene, Race in the 21st
Century: Equality Through Law?, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1515, 1529-33 (1990)
(questioning how anti-discrimination principles and equal protection analysis
fail to promote equality across and within groups); Charles R. Lawrence III, The
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317, 336-37 (1987) (continuing the presence of unconscious
racism); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 362-63 (1987) (challenging CLS




and political power to previously subordinated groups.214
The push of critical theories to substantive equality and
freedom can support many possible avenues for legal
reform. For example, Professor Derrick Bell has argued
that Brown v. Board of Education should have upheld the
"separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson and
upheld substantive equality of educational resources
between the races. 215 Professor Patricia J. Williams, to take
another example, has demonstrated that informal law, the
law in action as often attributed to the legal realists, can
lead in practice to unequal access to economic power among
the races through the creation of a double standard between
blacks and whites. 216 Formal rules, appropriately enforced,
can benefit subordinated groups, but the devil is in the
details that liberal theorists often ignore. Contrary to the
view traced to the legal realist tradition that law is a veil
that masks the real workings of power, some critical
theorists espouse a more careful calibration of law and its
relationship to power, suggesting that either the law's
absence or the law's presence can hurt racially
subordinated groups. 21 7 The hard question is how legal,
social, and economic institutions are shaped and the role of
individual and group voice in shaping those institutions. 21 8
What critical theories tell us about race is that
assimilation is not only a difficult and turbulent process,
but also a misguided one. At the heart of assimilation is an
essentializing of racial identity that requires its dissolution.
But the racial bonds are complex ones with many nodes and
214. For a discussion of the principle of substantive equality, see Chon,
supra note 16, at 2834; Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property "from Below"
Copyright and Capability for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 805-07
(2007).
215. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 77-87 (2004) (establishing the
economic roots of racism and need for substantive equality).
216. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 408 (1987).
217. See Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 2012-18
(1990) (analyzing the political process generated by Brown within which equal
protection principles operate).
218. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING
RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 32-67 (2002) (presenting a




bases. As Professor Neil Gotanda has noted, race and racial
categories arise in many stripes. 219 There are, to cite his
typology, formal-race, status-race, and culture-race, and
each of these mandates a different approach to curing the
ills of subordination. 220 Formal-race entails categories of
race that are applied rule-like to establish difference. It is
exemplified by the reference to "black patients" in the BiDil
patent or the "WHITES ONLY' signs of the Jim Crow era.
The law creates a category that has to be applied as tightly
as possible. Status-race is sociological, attributing race
based on social markers, like residential neighborhoods or
where one buys one's clothing. Status-race arises in how
goods might be marketed along ethnic lines, but may also
arise without reference to a racial category. Finally,
culture-race is an anthropological category, marking
distinctions based on practices and artifacts. This type of
race arises in the patent for skin color or hair and reflects
race as a dimension of culture. Since race is multidimensional
and is used in many different ways, it is not surprising that
the goal of assimilation is a contested and perhaps fruitless
one, absent, in the extreme, the elimination of different
races altogether.
This latter point permeates the work of Kenji Yoshino,
whose writings on queer theory have implications for the
analysis of racial categories in this Article. 221 Professor
Yoshino identifies three critical moves in the goal of
assimilation, moves that illustrate the futility of
assimilationism (and by implication color-blindness). 222 The
first move is that of conversion whereby the different other
(defined either in terms of race or sexual orientation or
gender) is absorbed into majority culture through attempts
to eradicate difference. 223 Integration is one part of this
move, but at the extremes may include expunging physical
differences such as hair texture or skin color. The second
move is one of passing, whereby difference is allowed but
219. Gotanda, supra note 209, at 37-40.
220. Id. at 37.
221. Yoshino, supra note 207, at 936-37 (addressing the claim that covering
essentializes based on object of cover by demonstrating how the critique of
covering is aimed at the anti-essentialization).
222. Id. at 783-84.
223. Id. at 784.
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placed behind a veil of sameness; the different other
attempts to adopt attributes of the majority with the aim of
acceptance. 224 The final move is that of covering, whereby
difference is allowed but silenced; the different other is able
to maintain difference but only in a closeted realm that is
acknowledged but not integrated into the realm of the
majority in civil society.225 Each of these moves, according
to Professor Yoshino, belie the myth of assimilation and
serve to further subordinate the other into the cultural,
political, and economic majority.
The mosaic of critical theories aids in defining the
connections between race and wealth maximization, race
and markets, and finally race and culture. These positions
are summarized in Table One in Part II.D and are
discussed in detail there. Critical theories would be highly
skeptical of the norm of wealth maximization and would
suggest that norms of justice and equity should at least
supplement, if not trump, considerations of wealth. Within
this modified view of wealth maximization, critical theories
would advocate for the principle of anti-subordination as a
counter to the tendencies of color-blindness percolating up
from liberal theories. While on the surface the anti-
subordination principle may seem similar to that of
corrective justice, critical theories seek more than the
remedial measures espoused by liberal theories. The anti-
subordination norm entails eradicating all vestiges of racial
subjugation and differentiation beyond remedying discrete
incidents of discrimination. In the realm of the market,
critical theories would endorse pluralism, recognizing the
place of ethnic enclaves in shaping markets and countering
subordination and discrimination of the past. Under this
view, race is more than a brand, a cosmetic label attached
to products. Race can serve to invigorate markets by
creating connections among groups through economic
empowerment and the distribution of real resources to
previously marginalized groups. Finally, in the domain of
culture, critical theories would advocate affirmative
empowerment, allowing badges of racial distinction to
flourish and enrich the domains of civic society in addition
to the market.
224. Id. at 785.




D. When Patent Law and Race Intersect: Summarizing the
Positions
Table One: Intersecting Theories of Patent and of Race
Liberal Critical Theories
Theories
Incentive Corrective Justice Anti- subordination
Theory




As Table One demonstrates, liberal theories and critical
theories complement each other in some ways but offer
distinct normative positions on the connections between
race and wealth maximization, race and markets, and race
and culture respectively. When juxtaposed with the three
theories of intellectual property, the theories of race provide
normative frameworks within which to assess use of racial
categories in patent law. This section has developed an
analytical framework from the intersection of theories of
intellectual property and race. In Part III, I apply this
framework to assess the proper treatment of racial
categories in patent law and answer the question: What
should we as legal theorists and policy makers discern from
the patents described in Part I?
III. COLOR-BLINDNESS VERSUS ACCOMMODATION IN THE
PATENT SYSTEM
Identifying racial categories in patent law presents an
opportunity to revisit fundamental questions about the
normative bases for the structure of patent law and the
treatment of race. Table One summarizes the various
normative positions that one can take towards the use of
racial categories in patents. In this Section, I analyze
several recommendations that have been offered by advocacy
groups and scholars about the proper treatment of racial
categories. Although these recommendations have been
made in response to the BiDil controversy, understanding
them requires appreciating the broader context of race and
patent law. Placing these recommendations in the context
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of the six positions identified in Table One, I then present
my own viewpoint that racial categories in patent law
should be understood through the lens of cultural theory
with several specific recommendations about how the
proper place for racial categories in patent claims and
patent specifications.
The debate over the racialized patents, and racialized
medicine more broadly, has yielded three identifiable
positions. First, the NAACP and other advocacy groups
have come out in favor of BiDil and race-focused medical
research and pharmaceuticals. 226  Targeting resources
towards racialized medicine, according to this view, corrects
for the lack of organized and cumulative attention by the
medical community to the needs of minority groups. The
second position, advocated by Professors Lillquist and
Sullivan, would find state support of racialized medicine as
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution.227 Professor Lillquist and Sullivan would
permit the use of race in private epidemiological studies in
order to identify and target underserved needs, but argue
that FDA approval of pharmaceuticals along racial lines
does not meet the standard of strict scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 228 Although these scholars do not
directly address the issue of patents, their argument would
have some clear implications, which are discussed below.
Finally, Professor Kahn addresses the issue of racialized
patents directly in his scholarship and expresses skepticism
226. See Keith J. Winstein, NAACP Presses U.S. on Heart Drug, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 25, 2007, at A20 (reporting advocacy by NAACP to obtain Medicare
coverage for BiDil). For academic commentary advocating BiDil and race-
specific therapies more broadly, see Gary Puckrein, BiDil From Another
Vantage Point, HEALTH AFF., Aug. 15, 2006, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
content/abstract/hlthaff.25.w368vl; see also Ruel, supra note 44, at 241.
227. Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial
Profiling in Medicine, 39 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391 (2004) [hereinafter Racial
Profiling]; Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, Legal Regulation of the Use of
Race in Medical Research, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 535 (2006).
228. See Kahn, supra note 14, at 361; Jonathan Kahn & Pamela Sankar,
Being Specific About Race-Specific Medicine, HEALTH AFF., Aug. 15, 2006,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/5/w375 ("Physicians should be
able to prescribe BiDil, if it is appropriate, to any patient regardless of race.").
For a similar position, focusing on the FDA approval process, see Sharona




of racialized pharmaceutical patents. 229  While he
acknowledges the NAACP position, his view is that drug
companies have used the opportunity to narrowly categorize
their patents along racial lines to expand their commercial
interests rather than to meet the needs of the public,
especially underserved groups. His criticism is in line with
broader scholarly prognoses of the current patent system,
which sacrifices the public interest, whether gauged by the
community of scientific researchers or consumers, for
commercial aggrandizement. 230
These three positions on racialized pharmaceutical
patents map onto Table One fairly readily. The NAACP
position follows from an incentive theory of patents
combined with a perspective somewhere between the liberal
and critical theory of race. While the NAACP position is not
articulated solely in terms of corrective justice, the position
does not fully adopt the anti-subordination position of
critical theory, although it is probably closer to this side of
the spectrum. Allowing race as a consideration in the
granting of a patent, or FDA approval, would create
incentives to develop diagnostic and pharmaceutical tools to
treat previously ignored diseases and to study neglected
populations. However, understanding patents solely as an
instrument to create incentives ignores the expressive
impact of patents and the possible effects of the patents on
the markets for pharmaceutical products and health care.
Nonetheless, the position would find a critical need to
create these incentives that would trump some of the
adverse consequences of racialized patents.
Professors Lillquist and Sullivan's appeal to the equal
protection clause echoes liberal theories of race with the
normative goal of color-blindness. Their work does not
directly address racialized patents, but we can distill their
argument from what they say about the equal protection
clause and FDA approval. The professors are highly critical
of the government's use of racial categories in its decision
making, particularly in the awarding of benefits. 231
Consistent with the color-blind principle, they would
229. Kahn, supra note 14, at 355.
230. Id. at 381. For a discussion of the current patent systems and
commercialization, see supra text accompanying note 158.
231. Racial Profiling, supra note 227, at 393.
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conclude that the use of racial categories in patent claims
would violate the equal protection clause. The more difficult
question is how they would treat the use of racial categories
in the patent specifications. In the context of the
specifications, racial categories do not serve to define who
obtains the state benefit and who does not. Instead, racial
categories serve a descriptive function to provide context for
the invention, serving as an interpretative tool to understand
the meaning of the patent and its claims. Given that
Professors Lillquist and Sullivan do not condemn the use of
racial categories in epidemiological studies, since this
represents private decision making not based on animus,
the inference is that they would not condemn racial
categories in patent specifications. Putting these pieces
together, the position would be that the state cannot
consider race in making decisions, but individual inventors
can take race into account as background context to their
inventions. Note that this position would be consistent with
any of the three theories of patents, and since Professors
Lillquist and Sullivan do not directly address patents in
their work, it would be speculative to determine which
theory they would endorse. What is clear, however, is that
their position flows from a strongly liberal theory of race,
one that endorses the color-blind principle.
Similarly, Professor Kahn's position also flows from a
liberal theory of race, one that would endorse color-
blindness and assimilation. But in contrast with Professors
Lillquist and Sullivan, Professor Kahn does have an explicit
theory of patents, one that combines the incentive and
market theories. 232 His concern is that using patents to
promote race-specific inventions will both create the wrong
set of incentives, by diverting research efforts into tailoring
existing drugs along racial lines, and transform the noble
goals of serving the unmet health care needs of African-
American communities into crass commercial ones. It is
important to note that Professor Kahn does support the
ambitions of the NAACP in correcting the deficiencies of
medical research and health care. 233 But his criticisms echo
many of the criticisms of the patent system for creating
strong private property rights that benefit established
business interests at the expense of innovation and meeting




the needs of the public. 234
Furthermore, Professor Kahn's position also echoes
traditional color-blind norms.235 For example, he questions
whether an existing chemical composition, such as BiDil,
should be granted a patent simply because an inventor
discovers a modification that meets the needs of a specific
racially defined group. To say that such a modification
satisfies the nonobviousness requirement assumes that the
baseline for determining obviousness is what works for a
white patient. 236 Racially defined patents reinforce existing
stereotypes and segregate medical research along racial
lines. Contrary to the NAACP position, Professor Kahn
notes that the use of racialized patents may have unintended
consequences and actually result in medical research
becoming focused on modifying existing drugs along racial
lines instead of innovating new drugs or therapies or
studying orphan diseases. 237 Although Professor Kahn's
argument is grounded in a liberal tradition, there is a
critical slant to his position. Racialized patents benefit the
well-to-do classes who can afford the new patented therapies
at the expense of the needy and continually neglected
segments of racially defined communities. In short, granting
patents along racial lines is a misguided policy, noble in
motives, but counterproductive in practice. Disallowing
such patents consistent with the color-blind principle is
necessary to avoid this path.
All of these positions raise compelling insights about
patent law and the use of racial categories. But each
considers only the case of racially defined pharmaceutical
patents. My research shows that racial categories, at least
those of African-American and Negro, have been pervasive
in the patent system. One needs to develop an approach to
racialized patents that takes into consideration the full range
of inventions where race has emerged as a consideration. I
contribute to this debate in light of the patents identified in
this Article by endorsing a cultural theory of patent law to
assess the use of racial categories in patent law. I also
contend that the cultural theory needs to be understood in
234. Id. at 393.
235. Kahn & Sankar, supra note 228.
236. See Kahn, supra note 14, at 394.
237. Id. at 395.
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conjunction with a liberal theory of race that adopts some of
the more salient features of the critical theories of race.
As compared to the incentive and market theories, a
cultural theory is best suited to address the issue of race in
patent law for two reasons. First, cultural theory subsumes
the other two. Since cultural theories aim to understand
patent's role in structuring civil society, and market
institutions are a part of civil society, cultural theories of
patent highlight how commercialization occurs within the
context of market and non-market institutions. Furthermore,
the incentive theory assumes that patents provide
incentives by allowing inventors to capture value. As value
is determined through forces of consumer needs and wants
as well as productive technologies, so the sources of value
include cultural factors as well as traditional market
factors. Therefore, cultural theory also informs the incentive
theory of patent.
The argument that cultural theory subsumes the other
two theories perhaps proves too much. But there are many
instances in which market theory and incentive theory may
be perfectly adequate without considerations of culture. For
example, understanding how a patent may affect the ability
of an inventor to commercialize a new type of chemical
process can be satisfactorily addressed through consideration
of market factors alone. But the racial dimension of the
patents described in Part I necessitates understanding both
the commercial and cultural contexts of these inventions.
Therefore, the fact that we are dealing with race supports
turning to the cultural theory of patents to assess the
inventions described in this Article normatively.
Under the terms of cultural theories of patent, racial
categories should be analyzed in terms of their effects on
promoting diversity (under a liberal theory of race) or
promoting affirmative empowerment (under a critical
theory of race). At this point, the analysis can take a number
of possible turns depending on whether one is aligned closer
with the liberal or the critical theory. Kenji Yoshino, for
example, has advocated for rigorous protection of cultural
attributes, whether within queer or racial communities as a
counterforce to assimilationism. 238  Richard Ford has
advocated for a more pragmatic position, one that supports
238. Yoshino, supra note 207, at 892.
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pluralism but does not lead to antagonism among groups. 239
To call Professor Ford's position a catholic one would be
ironic, given the battles over doctrine and rituals that has
marked Western Christianity, but Professor Ford is
concerned that the types of cultural claims endorsed by
Professor Yoshino are unsettling and potentially
destructive. 240 A more general point along these lines is
made by Madhavi Sunder who identifies parallels between
these debates over cultural markers in the arena of identity
politics and those over the ubiquity of privatization of
information and knowledge in the arena of intellectual
property. 241 Her solution is to turn to the normative goals of
distributive justice to resolve these oppositions and as a
means to mediate competing claims through the goal of
protecting groups that lack political and economic power. 242
Following her solution, rights claims, whether over culture
or over information, would be secured for those who have
the least access to political and market institutions.243
In the context of racialized patents, whether covering
pharmaceutical inventions, hair care products, or toys, the
use of racial categories should be assessed under a more
nuanced application of the anti-subordination principle.
The appropriateness of using these categories rests on their
effect on perpetuating the subordination of groups by
imposing limits on access to critical resources or by
perpetuating stereotypes. A nuanced application of this
principle would also recognize the principle that civil
society mandates some degree of cooperation and harmony
among various groups. 244 Therefore, this principle should be
applied to avoid claims that would put different groups in
opposition and further fragment or balkanize the public
arena. I am proposing a pragmatic application of the
principle of affirmative empowerment in the context of
239. RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 211-14 (2005)
(urging to look "beyond difference").
240. Id. at 97-124 (arguing against "racial characteristics" and the politics of
difference).
241. Sunder, supra note 176, at 273-76.
242. Id. at 273-74.
243. Id.
244. See generally Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the
Creation of Prosperity, in THE ESSENTIAL CIVIL SOCIETY READER: CLASSIC ESSAYS
IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL SOCIETY DEBATE 257 (Don E. Eberly ed., 2000).
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patent (and implicitly in intellectual property more
broadly). Three concrete propositions arise from this
argument: (1) the proper treatment of race in claims and
specifications, (2) the proper role of race in the
nonobviousness analysis, and (3) the proper role of race in
the utility analysis. I conclude this Section by discussing
each in turn.
A. A Racial Category Should Not Be an Element of a Patent
Claim, but May Be Used in the Patent Specifications
Patent claims define the legal rights that will be
enforced by the state in an action for infringement. 245
Patent specifications, by contrast, act as an interpretative
tool, providing the background context of an invention
against which to fix the legal meaning of the claims.246 The
use of a racial category in a patent claim requires the court
to define the meaning of that category when a particular
invention is used. For example, the claims in the BiDil
patent refer to a "black patient. ' 247 If a claim for infringement
arises with respect to this patent, the court would have to
determine if in fact the invention was used on a black
patient. In order to do this, the court would have to fix the
meaning of "black" as applied to the racial identity of an
individual.
Two problems arise from the interpretation of "black
patient." First, as a matter of patent doctrine, this claim
may fail for lack of definiteness. The Patent Act requires
''one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention. '248  This contemporary requirement is
explained by the need "to inform the public during the life
of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that
it may be known which features may be safely used or
manufactured without a license and which may not."249 A
claim is definite if "those skilled in the art would
understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light
245. See supra text accompanying note 10.
246. See supra text accompanying note 10.
247. U.S. Patent No. 6,465,463 col. 17 1.57 (filed Sept. 8, 2000).
248. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2000).
249. Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931).
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of the specification. '" 250 The use of a racial category in a
patent claim requires that the meaning of that contour be
understood. If there is ambiguity as to what makes a
patient "black," or Asian, or Hispanic, to provide other
examples, then the claim containing a racial category would
very likely be invalid.
Second, as a matter of policy, a court will have to worry
about interpreting the phrase "black patient" in a way that
effectively essentializes an aspect of individual identity,
concluding that one individual is black and another one is
not.251 This essentialization could occur whenever a racial
category is used in a patent claim and can be avoided only
by preventing racial categories in claim language.
Effectively, the patent owner cf a patent limited to African-
Americans would be the exclusive supplier of that invention
to the African-American community while others are free to
provide the same invention to non-African-American
communities. Race-specific patent claims create exclusivity
over a particular racially defined market.
The issue is different when racial categories are used in
patent specifications because the language of specifications
is more fluid and does not become fixed through legal
interpretation. Racial categories in specifications do not
create the risk of essentializing identities. Instead, the
specifications provide the context against which the claims
and the invention can be understood. 252 The presence of a
racial category in the specification does not limit the scope
of the invention or its application. Most importantly, it does
not exclude access to an invention based on the race of the
user. For example, if the specification states that an
invention was used on a particular racial group in
experimental trials or was motivated by practices within
racially defined communities, then these factors disclose the
background to the development of the invention but do not
impose limitations on how the invention can be practiced
for infringement purposes. Such disclosure is important for
assessing the relevance of the invention and for informing
250. Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
251. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 592 (1990).
252. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1576.
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future inventors about the background and context of the
invention without excluding access based on race.253
My proposal that racial categories should not be
allowed in claims, but should be allowed in specifications,
parallels my analysis of Professors Lillquist and Sullivan
above, but for very different reasons. Professors Lillquist
and Sullivan follow the strict color-blind principle as
applied to state action. 254 My proposal follows from the anti-
subordination principle in critical theory when understood
within the cultural theory of patents. Within this normative
framework, race is an acceptable factor for states to consider
as long as it counters historical practices of subordination
and does not impose stereotypical or disempowering
conceptions of racial identity. Since claim interpretation in
patent law fixes the meanings of words for infringement
analysis, racial categories in patent claims should be
avoided in order to prevent the essentialization of racial
identities. However, race can be used as a background
factor in order to combat and cure practices of subordination
and, therefore, would be acceptable in patent specifications.
Proponents of the incentive or market theory of patents,
however, would find my proposal to work against the
promotion of racially tailored or targeted research and
development initiatives. Since inventors who pursue these
initiatives could not capture the benefits of race-specific
inventions through claim language, these initiatives would
be undermined by my proposal. But this objection reflects
the critical differences between the cultural theories of
patent law and the other two. Incentive and market
theories focus on patents as legal instruments to promote
the creation and commercialization of inventions respectively.
253. The use of the disclosure as described here is referred to as the
possession requirement. The excerpt from the Permutit decision, supra text
accompanying note 249, illustrates one of the values underlying the possession
requirement: informing the public of the contours of the patent owner's property
right. See Permutit, 284 U.S. at 60. The possession requirement also prevents
the inventor from "pretending that his invention is more than what it really is,
or different from its ostensible objects .... " Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.)
356, 433-34 (1822); see also Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424
F.3d 1336, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
358 F.3d 916, 924-25 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For a discussion of the implications of the
possession requirement for patent policy, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession
in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. Rev. 123 (2006).
254. Racial Profiling, supra note 227, at 394.
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The focus is exclusively on the generation of profits from
innovation. The cultural theory of patents emphasizes that
the goal of patent law is to promote knowledge and access
within civil society of which the market is only one
institution. To the extent race-specific patent claims serve
to essentialize identities and deny access based on race,
then the benefits of incentivizing and commercializing race-
specific innovation needs to be balanced against the
subordinating use of racial categories. My proposal strikes
the correct balance by allowing racial categories to be
considered in the specification in order to have adequate
disclosure of the racial benefits of invention without the
fears of stigmatization and essentializing.
Since racial claims in patenting are so infrequent, this
proposal may have little bite. But to the extent that the
claims in the BiDil patent are the wave of the future, as
scholars like Professor Kahn suggest, 255 then the arguments
against race-specific claiming should be kept in mind. This
proposal can be implemented in a number of ways. First,
Congress could amend the Patent Act or the commissioner
could amend the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures
to prevent such claiming. 256 Second, courts should look upon
race-specific claims as they arise in litigation with
suspicion, holding that such claims are not enforceable
without violating the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution.257 However, the basis for this violation
should be grounded not in the color-blind principle, but on
the principle that enforcing such claims requires the state
to construe the meaning of racial terms in ways that
255. Kahn, supra note 14, at 379-83, 398-99.
256. The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, or MPEP, is published by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office and establishes the guidelines
for patent examiners in prosecuting patent applications. U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (8th ed. 2001, rev. ed. Sept. 2007). The MPEP does not have the
force of law and, therefore, preventing race-specific claims through its
guidelines would not have the same impact as a statutory prohibition. But such
a prohibition may influence the behavior of patent agents and the quality of
patenting. For example, the removal of the exception for business method
patents in the 1996 edition of the MPEP contributed to the acceptance of
business method patents in the late 1990s. See John W. Bagby, Business
Method Patent Proliferation: Convergence of Transactional Analytics and
Technical Scientifics, 56 Bus. LAw. 423, 436 (2000).
257. See Racial Profiling, supra note 227, at 391-94 for a similar proposal
based on the principle of color-blindness.
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essentialize the meaning of racial identity and potentially
stigmatize individuals based on their racial affiliation. 258
Put another way, the use of the racial category in patent
claims is not justified by a compelling state interest in
either promoting diversity or curing past discrimination, as
required under current law. 259
In the context of BiDil and other pharmaceutical
patents, race is often defined in terms of self-identification.
But even if the meaning of "black patient" in the BiDil
patent claim, or the similar use of racial identifiers in other
claims, is fixed through the decision of the user of the
invention, the problem discussed here is not cured for two
reasons. First, self-identification is not a basis for claim
interpretation. 260 While the Federal Circuit has recognized
that a patent owner can be her own lexicographer, 261 there
is no precedent for interpreting a patent claim through the
meaning given by a specific user of a patent. To the
contrary, the Federal Circuit has stated that a patent claim
should be given its ordinary meaning and the current
methodology for interpreting claims seems to eschew
idiosyncratic readings.262 Second, even with self-identification,
the problem remains that the patent owner becomes the
exclusive provider of the invention to a racially-defined group
while other groups are given a wider range of choices. This
disparate impact based on race still remains problematic even
if individuals are allowed to self-identify as "black." Self-
identification may actually lead to a perverse result as
individuals may seek to not self-identify as "black" in order to
avoid being captured by a monopolist vendor of the invention.
258. See supra text accompanying note 191.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50.
260. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317-19 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (identifying two sources for patent claim interpretation, intrinsic and
extrinsic evidence and not including interpretations by an individual user as an
interpretative source).
261. See Vitronics, Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
262. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (claims given their "ordinary and
customary meaning") (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582).
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B. A Racial Category Should Not Be a Consideration in the
Nonobviousness of an Invention
Racial categories are sometimes used to distinguish an
existing invention in order to obtain a new patent on the
underlying invention. Professor Kahn documents that
Nitromed pursued precisely this strategy in obtaining a
patent for BiDil.263 Many of the patents for toys, specifically
for board games, seemingly take traditional games and
tailor them to African-American heritage. Such racial
tailoring is desirable in order to promote diversity and
pluralism within the marketplace and civil society more
broadly. But such racial tailoring should not be the basis to
determine that the invention is nonobvious for two reasons.
To understand these reasons, let me first explain the
doctrine of nonobviousness.
In order to obtain a patent, an inventor must show that
the invention was useful, novel, nonobvious, and enabled.
Novelty means that the invention has not been disclosed in
all its elements in the prior art. However, even if an
invention is novel, a patent may be denied if the differences
between the invention and the prior art are obvious to
someone who has ordinary skill in the art.264 For example, I
could not obtain a patent on a standard deck of cards
because it is already known in the prior art. If I tried to
patent a deck of cards that used the likenesses of presidents
rather than kings and queens, such a patent would be
denied because I have just made a trivial change to a
known invention. The nonobviousness standard is designed
to be an objective inquiry that filters out trivial inventions
from the field of patenting. 265
The United States Supreme Court recently reviewed
the standard for nonobviousness in its 2007 KSR v. Teleflex
decision. 266 At issue in the case was the teach, suggest,
263. Kahn, supra note 14, at 403-05.
264. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 381 U.S. 1, 25-26, 37 (1966).
265. See generally COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004); FED. TRADE COMM'N, To
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW
AND POLICY (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; Cotropia,
supra note 67, at 912.
266. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
2008] 485
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
motivate (TSM) test that was used by the Federal Circuit to
review inventions for nonobviousness. Under the TSM test,
an invention would be found obvious if the prior art had
taught, suggested, or motivated it. The party claiming that
an invention could not be patented because it was not
nonobvious would have the burden to point to a prior art
reference that taught, suggested, or motivated the invention.
Failure to do so meant that the party failed to show
obviousness, and the invention would meet the nonobviousness
requirement. The Supreme Court granted review of the
KSR case to examine the mechanical application of the
TSM standard by the USPTO and lower courts. The Court
expressed concern that the TSM test, as applied by the
agency and the courts, had become uprooted from the
nonobviousness jurisprudence established by the Supreme
Court in its 1964 Graham v. Deere decision.267
In Graham, the Court established a three step
methodology for determining nonobviousness: (1) the prior
art was identified, (2) differences between the invention and
the prior art were determined, and (3) the differences were
examined to establish whether they would be nonobvious to
a person having ordinary skill in the art. This inquiry could
be undertaken, according to the Court, against the
background of secondary considerations, such as the nature
of the problem the invention addressed, the invention's
response to long-felt needs in the field, and market
considerations. The Court concluded that, as applied, the
TSM approach potentially ignored the Graham methodology
by de-emphasizing the common sense and judgment of the
person having ordinary skill in the art. In many instances,
the prior art may not teach, suggest, or motivate an
invention precisely because the invention would be obvious
for a person having ordinary skill in the art to practice. For
example, the deck of cards modified for African-American
heritage may never be mentioned in the prior art as a
possible variation on a traditional deck of cards because an
inventor of games may see this as obvious and therefore not
worth teaching, suggesting or motivating. But under a
mechanical application of the TSM test, this failure to find
a teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art would
make it impossible for someone challenging the patentability
of the invention to show that the invention was obvious.
267. Id. at 1739.
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The Supreme Court in the KSR decision, however, states
that the challenger could look to the common sense of
judgment of the person having ordinary skill in the art to
argue that the invention is in fact obvious because it is a
common-sensical variation of what was known in the field.
The KSR decision has been controversial because it
seems to make the nonobviousness inquiry more open-
ended and unpredictable. 268 With respect to race-specific
patents, the KSR decision calls into question the
patentability on nonobviousness grounds of inventions that
have been tailored to particular racial groups. As
documented in Part I, there is evidence that the TSM
approach was applied to find that some of the race-specific
inventions were nonobvious. Cases following the Supreme
Court's KSR decision, particularly in the pharmaceutical
area, have relied upon evidence of what a person having
ordinary skill in the art would find obvious as
supplementing the TSM inquiry. In both Dystar269 and Alza
Corp.,270 for example, the Federal Circuit expressly relied
upon arguments about what a person having ordinary skill
in the art would deem to be "obvious to try" in determining
that variations in dosage levels would not make a known
chemical compound nonobvious. In Sandoz 271 and Sud-
Chemie,272 two cases dealing with new combinations of
268. For pre-KSR cases that apply a more stringent standard for
nonobviousness in the pharmaceutical area, see the cases discussed in note 45,
supra. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court's decision in KSR has been
interpreted, see Hal Milton & Patrick R. Anderson, The KSR Standard for
Patentability, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 615, 628-29 (2007)
(interpreting the KSR decision as a common sense selection test that removes a
presumption of nonobviousness).
269. Dystar Textilfarben GMBH v. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (adopting a common sense approach to the nonobviousness inquiry in
anticipation of the then pending Supreme Court decision in KSR).
270. Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1293-95 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(finding, also in anticipation of the Supreme Court decision in KSR, that
changes in dosage form for a known pharmaceutical compound did not
constitute a nonobvious invention).
271. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d. 846, 851-53 (N.D. Ill.
2007) (describing the Supreme Court's decision in KSR as cautioning against a
strict application of the TSM approach).
272. Sud-Chemie, Inc. v. Multisorb Techs., Inc., No. 3:03CV-29-S, 2007 WL
2669366 (W.D. Ky. 2007) (person skilled in the art would have reason to make




known compounds to form a new pharmaceutical, lower
courts used evidence that a person having ordinary skill in
the art would have reason to make the combinations based
on general knowledge in the field in the nonobviousness
analysis. Although the ultimate implications of the KSR
decision are to be determined, the tenor of the Court's
opinion and recent decisions strongly suggest that race-
specific patents, particularly in the pharmaceutical area,
will have greater scrutiny under the nonobviousness
analysis.
This additional scrutiny is desirable for reasons of
policy as well as law. One objection to racial tailoring is the
frequent objection that patents recently have been granted
to trivial variations on known products.273 This objection
stems from a concern with the integrity of the patent
system and the need to promote innovation in the
marketplace. Although these criticisms have been made
from the perspective of incentive or market theories of
patent law, the cultural theory of patents would also
provide a basis for trivial patents. If inventors were allowed
to take known inventions, whether in the field of
biotechnology, pharmaceutical, or entertainment, and
simply place a racial spin on them, then the market could
be flooded with products and services that have a veneer of
cultural diversity without necessarily affirmatively
empowering traditionally subordinated groups. The
objection is not based on lack of cultural or racial
authenticity, but the fear of racial pandering that would be
promoted by allowing race alone to be a factor in the
nonobviousness inquiry.
Allowing race alone to be a factor in the nonobviousness
inquiry raises the possibility of "double patenting." Section
101 states that "a" patent shall be granted to an invention
that meets that standard of patentability. 274 The singular
article has been construed to mean that an invention can be
patented only once. This restriction applies to obvious
changes to an invention as well as literal replications of a
previously patented invention. As the Federal Circuit has
stated, "double patenting is a judicially created doctrine
adopted to prevent claims in separate applications or
273. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4, at 34-35.
274. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); see also supra text accompanying note 33.
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patents that do not recite the 'same' invention, but
nonetheless claim inventions so alike that granting both
exclusive rights would effectively extend the life of patent
protection. ' 275 In the case of race-specific patents, the
concern is that an inventor may take a known invention
and seek to obtain a second patent by tailoring it to a
racially or ethnically defined market. This practice seems to
be the case with BiDil, which Nitromed patented as a race-
specific variant on a chemical compound whose patent had
expired. The rule against double patenting should be
applied to prevent this result.
A third objection is the essentializing effect of the use of
race in the nonobviousness inquiry itself. To say that
adding race alone to a known invention makes the
invention nonobvious assumes that the underlying baseline
is that of the white majority. As a practical matter, the
nonobviousness inquiry is based on the policy of
encouraging certain directions of inventive activity. For
example, it has been noted that the nonobviousness standard
is lower for biotechnology inventions with the result of
promoting faster innovation in that industry.276 Analogously,
the case has been made that considering race as a factor for
nonobviousness would spur greater innovation in neglected
areas of research and medicine.277 But applying the
nonobviousness standard in this way would tend to define
what constitutes normal invention and innovation in terms
of majoritarian terms. The risk is that companies will use a
race-based nonobviousness standard to create trivial
variations of existing inventions rather than develop
inventions that target the substantive needs of previously
neglected populations. 278
275. Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1373 (2005).
276. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1634 (2003).
277. See Kahn, supra note 14, at 403 (stating the argument).
278. See id. at 405 (challenging the argument). The history of the BiDil
patent is a concrete example of this theoretical possibility. Nitromed pursued
the race-specific patent claims in the shadow of the expiration of its earlier
patent that was not racially tailored in 2003. The business plan seems to be one
of expanding the patent life of the invention through racial tailoring.
2008] 489
490 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
C. A Racial Category Can Be Used in Consideration of the
Utility of an Invention
In order to obtain a patent, the inventor must
demonstrate some application, or utility, for the invention.
This utility must be substantial and specific. The utility
requirement serves two purposes. First, it ensures that
patents are granted to inventions that do have some
application and are not merely theoretical or abstract
creations. 279 Second, it ensures that the inventor has
sufficiently worked on her invention to discover its
applications in a substantive and well-defined way.28 0
Racial categories can be used in determining the utility
of an invention, particularly in promoting the affirmative
empowerment of racially defined groups. While racial
categories in patent claims and in the nonobviousness
inquiry may serve to reify stereotypes or essentialize
elements of identity, racial categories in the context of
utility can serve to identify beneficial applications of
inventions that can target inventive activity towards
previously ignored or neglected groups without essentializing
them. 28 l For example, in the context of racialized medicine,
the utility requirement can identify how particular
treatments or innovations address orphan diseases. The
279. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) ("The basic quid pro
quo [of a patent] ... is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with
substantial utility.").
280. See id. ("[A] patent is not a hunting license."). It is the reward for a
successful hunt.
281. The beneficial utility requirement can be traced to Justice Story's
opinion in Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No.
8,568) holding that an invention that is "frivolous or injurious to the well-being,
good policy, or sound morals of society" could not be granted a patent. Courts
and the USPTO have retreated from this morality limitation on patentability.
See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir.
1999) ("[T]he principle that inventions are invalid if they are principally
designed to serve immoral or illegal purposes has been applied broadly in recent
years."). Commentary on beneficial utility has been mixed among the academic
community. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms:
The Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1062-
68 (1988) (expressing skepticism towards the beneficial utility requirement as
applied to technology regulation). But see Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask
Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 469, 472 (2003) (advocating a revival of the morality limitation on
patenting for biotechnology).
RACE-SPECIFIC PATENTS
utility requirement can also identify niche markets, such as
for the hair and skin related products described in Part I.
Therefore, utility can be used to promote racial pluralism in
inventorship without the problem of essentializing racial
categories by using these categories to provide the context
for inventions. Furthermore, allowing race to be a factor in
the utility analysis would benefit inventors that target
some beneficial applications to subordinated communities
without imposing the negative implications that would
arise from the use of race in the claims or in the
nonobviousness inquiry. There are three caveats to this
proposal.
First, the utility requirement is just one of five
requirements for patentability. Therefore, just because race
is an accepted factor for utility does not mean that
identifying a racial application will be sufficient for the
award of a patent. Having used race to satisfy the utility
requirement, the inventor would in addition have to show
how the novelty, nonobviousness, enablement, and subject
matter criteria are met with non-race based factors. My
proposal allows for the consideration of race to promote
affirmative empowerment in the civic sphere while avoiding
some of the damaging uses of race. I pursue this goal by
allowing considerations of race for the purposes of utility,
but limiting the use of race in claims and for
nonobviousness.
Second, even with the utility requirement there is the
risk that race will be used to essentialize groups,
particularly through assumptions about race as a genetic
marker in the context of pharmaceutical inventions. This
danger can be avoided by having a high standard for
substantial utility when race is being considered.28 2
Epidemiological information on incidence of disease and
success of treatment can be data in establishing utility, but,
282. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001)
(requiring specific and substantial utility that affects a "real world" use, as
opposed to an abstract or throw-away utility); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1368,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (imposing a high standard of specific and substantial
utility to deny the patenting of "express sequence tags," as being too general
and speculative to constitute real world utility). Cf. Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93
F.3d 1559, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("In the pharmaceutical arts, our court has
long held that practical utility may be shown by adequate evidence of any
pharmacological activity."). For race-specific pharmaceuticals, a higher
standard for utility is mandated.
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as has been pointed out, it would be dangerous to make any
inferences from such data that there is a genetic component
of race. Such epidemiological data would be consistent
with the view that race is purely socially constructed and
that differences are the result of historical practices that
neglected or subordinated certain racial or ethnic
groups. 28 3
Third, racial categories can arise in a way that
perpetuates stereotypes, as evidenced by the various
patents on toys from the nineteenth century. The utility
requirement should be applied to distinguish between
beneficial and subordinating uses of racial categories. 28 4
Once again substantial utility can serve as a filter between
these two competing types of uses. If the application of the
invention serves to benefit racial groups by including
previously excluded groups within civil society, such as
through recognizing market niches or products targeted
towards emerging segments of the economy, then beneficial
utility would be established. Similarly, targeting orphan
diseases would also meet the beneficial utility
requirement. 28 5
A difficult question is raised by patents that might have
both beneficial and subordinating uses. For example, the
skin depigmentation patent can be used to correct for skin
diseases, but can also be used to serve a market that
facilitates "passing," or legitimizes negative stereotypes
about non-white skin. Within the cultural theory of patent,
such mixed use inventions pose a deep dilemma and reflect
schisms within communities about individual autonomy in
283. See Raj Bhopal, Race and Ethnicity: Responsible Use From
Epidemiological and Public Health Perspectives, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 500,
502 (2006); Morris W. Foster, Analyzing the Use of Race and Ethnicity in
Biomedical Research From a Local Community Perspective, 34 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 508, 510 (2006); Margaret A. Winker, Race and Ethnicity in Medical
Research: Requirements Meet Reality, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 520, 522 (2006).
284. I have been critical of morality limitations on patentability in earlier
writings. See Ghosh, supra note 145, at 1362. I still agree with my earlier
position in that the goal of patent law is not to police troubling technologies. I
am, however, acknowledging here that in the construction of race, morality does
play some role in not extending patent protection to racialized patents that may
subordinate racial groups.
285. See, e.g., Douglas Loughnot, Potential Interactions of the Orphan Drug
Act and Pharmacogenomics: A Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses?, 31 AM. J.L.
& MED. 365, 368 (2005).
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how an individual shapes and defines one's identity.286 In
this case, my proposal is to look skeptically upon inventions
that have some subordinating uses and carefully balance
the beneficial uses with the potentially subordinating uses.
In the case of the depigmentation patent, the therapeutic
benefits of the invention would need to be shown to be
substantial to counter the potential subordinating uses.
I have made the case for assessing race based patents
through a cultural theory of patents that incorporates a
norm of anti-subordination from critical theories of race. My
goal is to use the patent system to promote pluralism and
affirmative empowerment within civil society. The approach
I propose is designed to coordinate the tensions between
commercialization and race in the development of race-
specific patents and race-specific markets. The patents
documented in Part I show that racial categories have been
and continue to be present in the patent system. What we
make of this history and the continuing presence of racial
categories in patenting rests on the normative underpinning
of patent law and of our use of race. The proposals I make
here provide a path for the beneficial promotion of race in
contemporary civil society based on the commercialization
of innovation.
CONCLUSION
I end this Article by emphasizing that my analysis in
these pages is just a beginning. 28 7 By exploring the role of
race in patent law, I intend to establish a foundation for
286. See AMARTYA SEN, REASON BEFORE IDENTITY: THE ROMANES LECTURE
FOR 1998, at 1-31 (1999). For a concrete example, consider the recent and
ongoing debate over the identity of Barack Obama. See, e.g., Amos N. Jones,
Black Like Obama: What the Junior Illinois Senator's Appearance on the
National Scene Reveals about Race in America, and Where We Should Go from
Here, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 79, 80 (2005) (asking the question "When, how,
and why did Barack Obama become black?").
287. Future research will extend the empirical analysis to include other
racial and ethnic categories. A very important extension would look to the role
of gender in patent law, much like other scholars have examined gender in
copyright and trademark. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex:
Gender, Feminism, and Copyright Law, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L.




exploring how intellectual property law serves to do more
than create financial rewards or promote commercialization.
If there is one point to be gathered from this Article, it is
that inventorship and creativity occur in a social context
and that context is reflected in both what is created and
how it is described. The use of racial categories reflects how
the language of race can very readily and unsurprisingly
enter the language of invention and innovation.
The more difficult question is what to make of this
convergence. Liberal theories of race, and the principles of
color-blindness and assimilation, would instruct against the
use of racial categories in all governmental decision
making, including the award of patents. But the color-blind
principle works against the role of patent law in promoting
progress, which would include progress in assimilating groups
previously ignored in the marketplace and other institutions
of civil society. If patents promote positive externalities,
then why not the positive externalities created through
racial inclusiveness and assimilation?28 8 I have made the
point that a cultural theory of patents, and intellectual
property more broadly, is necessary to address this question
and, specifically, a cultural theory that is attuned to the
conflicting views of race. From this theory, I have proposed
ways in which race can be incorporated into the patent
inquiry in order to promote the goals of affirmative
empowerment and pluralism by avoiding the essentializing
possibilities of patent law documented by other scholars.
So if this is just the beginning, what next? I hope this
Article serves as a useful contribution to understanding
how race has been used in patent law beyond the domain of
pharmaceutical patents, where it has been studied
previously. But I am also hoping that the integration of
theories of intellectual property with theories of race (and
gender in future research) will lead to greater debate about
the place of intellectual property in constructing civil
society. The presence of race in patent law shows that the
law of intellectual property, with all its promises for the
future, is intertwined with lingering dilemmas from the
past.
288. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 257, 259 (2007) (analyzing the role of positive externalities in intellectual
property law).
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